

# **Confucius Institutes in Context: An Investigation of Chinese Soft Power**

Teresa Ann Shoemaker

IRG 678 HB  
International Relations and Global Studies  
The University of Texas at Austin  
Submitted for the Plan II Thesis Requirement

May 2017

---

Michael R Anderson, Ph.D.  
College of Liberal Arts  
Supervising Professor

---

Patricia Maclachlan, Ph.D.  
College of Liberal Arts  
Second Reader

**Abstract**

Author: Teresa Shoemaker

Title: Confucius Institutes in Context: An Investigation of Chinese Soft Power

Supervising Professor: Dr. Michael Anderson

This thesis strives to contribute to the literature on Chinese soft power and China's involvement in Africa by answering the following research questions: What is soft power in the Chinese context, and how is it exercised in Africa? Why is that significant, and what does it tell us about China in Africa? After identifying distinct Chinese and Western definitions of soft power, the thesis uses both to analyze the case of Confucius Institutes (facilities for Chinese culture and language learning) in Kenya. It is concluded that the institutes are reflective of China's overarching foreign policy goals. Despite distinct evaluations of the institutes arising from the Chinese and Western definitions of soft power, the term is still useful for understanding Chinese engagement with Africa. An implication for Chinese soft power is that it has potential for growth. The study also concludes Chinese involvement in Africa through the institutes has positive outcomes for Africa, and that Africa is instrumental to China's rise.

**Acknowledgements**

I would like to express gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Anderson, and second reader, Dr. Maclachlan, for their insights and guidance. I would also like to thank all of the IRG and Plan II professors and faculty for providing excellent programs that consistently challenged my preconceived notions, always pushed me to investigate issues further, and complemented my passion for a life of learning. I'm also appreciative of my parents' support throughout my undergraduate career and the thesis process. Last but not least, thank you Maxwell for the endless pep talks and pad thai that fueled me through college.

## Table of Contents

<b>Title Page</b>	1
<b>Abstract</b>	2
<b>Acknowledgments</b>	3
<b>Table of Contents</b>	4
<b>List of Abbreviations</b>	6
<b>Research Objectives</b>	7
<b>Methodology</b>	8
<b>Chapter</b>	
<b>I Introduction</b>	9
China's Foreign Policy	11
Confucius Institutes	15
Concluding Remarks	21
<b>II Theoretical Framework</b>	23
Soft Power	23
Soft Power in the Chinese Context	25
Concluding Remarks	32
<b>III Kenya</b>	34
Kenya's Value as a Case Study	35
Confucius Institutes In Kenya	40
Confucius Institutes as Exemplary of Soft Power In the Chinese Context	41
Confucius Institutes in Kenya According to the Western Conception of Soft Power	50
<b>IV Conclusion</b>	54
The Significance for Soft Power in the Chinese Context And Implications for China in Africa	54
Conclusion	56

<b>Appendix</b>	58
<b>Bibliography</b>	59
<b>Biography</b>	68

## Abbreviations

CCTV	China Central Television
CI	Confucius Institute
CNP	Comprehensive National Power
CPC	Communist Party of China <sup>1</sup>
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EAC	East African Community
EU	Egerton University
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
FTZ	Free Trade Zone
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HSK	Chinese Language Proficiency Examination
IO	International Organization
KU	Kenyatta University
LDC	Less Developed Country
MU	Moi University
NOTCFL	Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language
NSE	Nairobi Securities Exchange
OBOR	One Belt, One Road
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PRC	People's Republic of China
SGR	Standard Gauge Railway
UoN	University of Nairobi

---

<sup>1</sup> While the translation 'Chinese Communist Party' (CCP) continues to be used in literature written by Western authors, the party has recently begun using 'Communist Party of China' (CPC) in English translations of its official documents and websites. This thesis will use the more recent 'CPC' translation.

## Research Objectives

This thesis aims to contribute to scholarship concerning China's soft power and involvement in Africa. Soft power in the Chinese context will be defined as a tool used towards China's foreign policy objectives that is more flexible and expansive than the term as defined in the Western literature ('co-optive' power that originates from a society's institutions, values, and culture, excluding military and economic factors). The Chinese soft power concept is more extensive in that it both impacts and is impacted by China's image abroad. China's soft power is a component of its comprehensive national power (CNP), and is an important consideration in its foreign policy because it informs China's status as a global power and subsequently, ability to seek continued economic growth.

Specific questions guiding this investigation are as follows: What is soft power in the Chinese context and how is it exercised in Africa? Why is this significant and what does it tell us about China in Africa? The relevance of these questions is several fold, as their answers will illuminate: 1) differences between Chinese and Western notions of soft power 2) China's overarching foreign policy strategy 3) Africa's significance for China's policy goals, and the importance of China to Africa, and 4) any implications this discussion may have on the utility of soft power as a theoretical term, and as a real-world foreign policy tool.

In order to reach an appropriate level of depth, the thesis will examine the case of Confucius Institutes in Kenya. Confucius Institutes (CIs) are venues for Chinese culture and Mandarin language learning abroad. There are currently 500 institutes worldwide. The institutes are frequently referenced as a resource of China's soft power China. Kenya presents an interesting case study because it is of geographic interest to China, Kenyan officials are in favor

of educational cooperation with China as they perceive a knowledge-based economy as an appropriate route for growth, and Kenya is home to more CIs (four) than is typical for an African country (zero, one, or two).

## **Methodology**

After introducing relevant contextual information regarding China's foreign policy and involvement in Africa, the thesis then introduces a theoretical framework of soft power to be used for analysis of Confucius Institutes in practice, and offers commentary on the significance of the findings. Many scholarly sources were used to grasp the debates at hand and gather data. The thesis makes use of a multitude of news sources, which should be interpreted as a strength, as it allowed the author to uncover the issues various stakeholders prioritize, and importantly, their attitudes and perceptions regarding these topics. Comprehending attitudes was significant for the research because soft power can be heavily dependent on sentiments.



## Chapter One: Introduction

While China's engagement in Africa has garnered much attention in the last decade, ties between the two are rooted in history. In 1964, Zhou Enlai (the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s first Premier) visited Africa. Zhao Ziyang, China's Premier at the time, toured the continent in 1982. He visited eleven states in four weeks. His message was that of cooperation between China and Africa, and mutually beneficial South-South development. Many other instances of diplomatic contact have occurred in modern history, as well as conferences and partnerships.

Western scholars tend to inquire about China's intentions for the continent. In writing for the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), with the objective of informing Department of Defense and U.S. Army leaders, David Brown asserts "China's four main interests in Africa are: securing natural resources, including petroleum and strategic minerals; tapping an emerging market that has great long-term potential and is underestimated by the West; securing political support from African nations in the United Nations (UN); and ensuring Taiwan's diplomatic isolation." China's top priority among those goals "is to increase access to energy, minerals, and raw materials to fuel China's rapid industrialization and emerging consumer society."<sup>2</sup> While not necessarily a consensus, many Western scholars discussing China's role in Africa share this point of view.

However, other scholars possess a more optimistic view, highlighting Africans' general positivity in approaching China as a development model. A significant factor considered in this view is aid. China offers assistance in areas that other donors typically underserve – educational

---

<sup>2</sup> David E. Brown, *Hidden Dragon, Crouching Lion: How China's Advance in Africa is Underestimated and Africa's Potential Underappreciated* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012), 1-2, 7.

scholarships, infrastructure, and production. Moreover, China has provided funds without stipulations requiring political reform, which differs from most of the standard Western packages that have the potential for causing instability as a result of reform demands. In addition, China does not make heavy use of structural adjustment loans as Western donors do. As for the purpose driving China's aid programs, Deborah Brautigam observes that "China gives aid for three reasons: strategic diplomacy, commercial benefit, and as a reflection of society's ideologies and values." Brautigam considers aid provisions a foreign policy tool. From this perspective, the view that China is simply looking to gain resources is not an accurate representation of the situation.<sup>3</sup>

Regardless of the authors' opinion, various topics are common when observing China's activity in Africa, including increasing trade and investment, construction and infrastructure projects, and political interactions, such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). These activities echo the relationship the PRC developed with Japan during its period of modernization – Japan provided technological insight and infrastructure, and China repaid in oil and the goods produced from the new equipment (the U.S. jumped on board soon after, investing in Chinese markets as well). There was also much traction in the media given to the mounting investments in both cases. A key takeaway is that China perceived these occurrences as helpful to its development. This history has informed the PRC's own formation of aid deals for less developed countries (LDCs) and its general view of the possibility for 'win-win' cooperation that may exist between nation-states at various stages of development. Moreover, 'aid' in the

---

<sup>3</sup> Deborah Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009).

traditional sense, i.e. one-directional assistance, was abandoned in favor of partnership, from which both parties could prosper. In this way, ‘aid’ became intimately related to investment.<sup>4</sup>

This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature by commenting on how Chinese soft power is exercised in Africa, and by noting its significance for China in Africa. In order to understand China’s involvement in Africa, it is useful to first understand China’s broader policy goals.

### **China’s Foreign Policy**

China’s foreign policy goals relevant to this thesis can be summarized as follows:

China’s soft power-based rising strategy and its new foreign policy concepts seek to reassure other countries, especially the United States and China’s neighboring countries, that a rising China will not become a revisionist power by threatening world peace and regional stability.<sup>5</sup>

This section will establish the background of that strategy and comment on its application to the discussion at hand.

In 1978, Deng Xiaoping initiated the ‘reform and opening up’ (gaige kaifang 改革开放) of China, in which the Chinese market liberalized and foreign direct investment (FDI) was invited into the state. The next few decades brought substantial growth. In 2001, China launched its ‘going out’ strategy (zou chuqu 走出去), which entailed a shift from encouraging FDI into China, to cultivating investments and manufacturing abroad. It also joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the same year, and has become more active in international organizations (IOs) in general.

In light of these economic changes and expanded involvement in global politics, the ‘rise of China’ has become an increasingly popular topic in international relations. Western scholars

---

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Sheng Ding, “Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: A New Look at China's Rise to the Status Quo Power,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 19 no. 64, (March 2010): 267.

tend to navigate China's broadening strength and influence in the world through a lens that focuses upon the impact to the author's own state. Some view China as a 'revisionist' power, able to usurp the status quo power's (U.S.'s) hegemony. In this manner, certain scholars have indicated that China's rise is antagonistic to the U.S.'s sustained global preeminence, whereas others contend Washington's inaction is more responsible for the current and projected state of affairs, rather than China's self-purporting campaigns.<sup>6</sup> From the Chinese perspective, its recent successes are not indicative of a 'rise,' but rather, a 'rejuvenation,' which implies a return to the great power status it previously championed, as opposed to the creation of something entirely new.<sup>7</sup> Chinese scholars have termed the notion postulated within certain pieces of Western literature that China's rise is a zero-sum game the 'China threat' theory. This theory has spurred great interest in government leaders and Chinese scholars on the topic of public diplomacy and soft power as means of offsetting China's negative image in the West.<sup>8</sup> After the Cold War, China increased its public diplomacy budget (while the United States substantially reduced its own).<sup>9</sup>

In fact, improving its image abroad has dominated a significant share of China's foreign policy dialogue and initiatives.<sup>10</sup> In the early 2000's, to quell the 'China threat' anxiety and strive

---

<sup>6</sup> Yiwei Wang, "Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. 16, (March 2008), accessed November 3, 2016.

<sup>7</sup> Sheng Ding, *The Dragon's Hidden Wings: How China Rises With its Soft Power* (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2008).

<sup>8</sup> Yiwei Wang, "Public Diplomacy and the rise of Chinese Soft Power"

<sup>9</sup> Joshua Kurlantzick, "China's Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 47 (June 2006), accessed November 10, 2016.

<sup>10</sup> International perceptions have been acknowledged in China's foreign policy prior to its period of dramatic growth. Following the Communist Party's ascension to power in China, the nation underwent three decades of self-prescribed isolation until Deng Xiaoping initiated the reform era in 1978. In 1967, 75% of Americans held a 'very unfavorable' view of China, 16% held an 'unfavorable opinion,' and 5% held a 'favorable opinion.' In the beginning of the reform era, Chinese officials sought to address its poor image by establishing the 'foreign propaganda with Chinese characteristics' (Zhongguo tese de duiwai xuanchuan 中国特色的对外宣传) strategy to popularize a positive view of China ('propaganda' was revised to 'publicity' because of Western connotations of 'propaganda'). While the 1980's saw improvement in polling of China's image, China faced a setback with its response to student demonstrations in 1989.

towards its broader policy goals, Chinese officials packaged China's efforts as a 'peaceful rise' (heping jueqi 和平崛起), which later became 'peaceful development' (heping fazhan 和平发展).<sup>11</sup> These phrases and the concepts they represent serve as China's acknowledgment of conflict that has coincided with the rise of powers in the past, and is an attempt to explain its commitment to peace. China would like to instead propagate a 'China opportunity' sentiment. These efforts are a part of China's broader aim towards global image management. The strategy acknowledges that "image and reputation have become essential parts of a state's strategic capital."<sup>12</sup> There appears to be a scholarly consensus that China's policy is intended to attain acceptance abroad, to grant China an agenda-setting role on the international stage, and to form an international climate favorable to China's economic development. China's overall aim is to gain a greater diplomatic presence and flourish economically while maintaining peaceful relations with other nations. Perhaps a more tacit reason driving the pursuit of image management is that attaining esteemed recognition abroad will grant the party internal legitimacy, allowing the regime to continue.<sup>13</sup> In addition to China's self-reported endeavors to counter the 'China Threat' theory, Western analysis has identified other goals for China's public diplomacy efforts, including attaining legitimacy and respect with regard to both its regime classification and its well-meaning intentions for its population. China also wants to be viewed positively in its economic partnerships and as a member of the global community.<sup>14</sup>

---

Sheng Ding, "Branding a Rising China: An Analysis of Beijing's National Image Management in the Age of China's Rise," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 46, no. 3 (2011): 297.

<sup>11</sup> Chinese leaders abandoned the 'rise' language in favor of 'development' in order to further distance China from aggressive connotations that may accompany 'rise' from some points of view.

<sup>12</sup> Van Ham, paraphrased in Sheng Ding, "Branding a Rising China: An Analysis of Beijing's National Image Management in the Age of China's Rise," 294.

<sup>13</sup> Sheng Ding, "Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: A New Look at China's Rise to the Status Quo Power," 257.

<sup>14</sup> Ingrid d'Hooghe, "The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations." *Public Diplomacy in the People's Republic of China*. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

Within China, there is the belief that bolstering its ‘comprehensive national power’ (zonghe guoli 综合国力) is necessary to attain great power status, which is the primary means for achieving its goals of sustained economic growth without military conflict. The reasoning is that becoming a great power will enable China to make decisions in international relations that are pursuant to its economic interests. The nation’s “highest development strategy is to seek to build comprehensive national strength while maintaining internal stability.”<sup>15</sup> Comprehensive national power (CNP) is the combination of a nation’s hard and soft power (to be explained further in the second chapter).<sup>16</sup> It is within this framework that soft power, particularly its effective development and use, becomes a topic of interest for Chinese leaders. In other words, soft power is viewed as: 1) a component of the nation’s overall power and 2) a route towards improved image abroad, both of which will contribute to China’s increased capacity to make political decisions and maintain economic growth. Subsequently, the media, press, and cultural aspects of China have been purposefully launched abroad as tools in China’s soft power campaign.

Confucius Institutes are one component of this endeavor. Numerous academicians propose these efforts are “intended to create and maintain an environment desirable for continued development in China.” In this way, the broader goal is to manufacture a representation of China that quells suspicions about its rapid economic growth and a world order in flux.<sup>17</sup> As such, the country has linked its broader aspiration to enhance diplomatic and

---

<sup>15</sup> Sheng Ding, *The Dragon’s Hidden Wings: How China Rises With its Soft Power*.

<sup>16</sup> According to President Jiang Zemin, “the fundamental task of socialism is to develop productive forces, enhance the comprehensive national strength of our socialist country, and improve the people’s living standards and in this way reflect the superiority of socialism over capitalism.”

Sheng Ding, “Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: A New Look at China’s Rise to the Status Quo Power,” 264.

<sup>17</sup> Xiaolin Guo, “Repackaging Confucius: PRC Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Soft Power.” Institute for Security and Development Policy (January 2008): 9.

economic strength to the prevalence of the Chinese language internationally.<sup>18</sup> Confucius Institutes are thereby a tangible solution for promoting Mandarin and Chinese culture abroad in order to achieve the intangible results China seeks (new avenues for economic growth without military conflict, agenda-setting capabilities, and general tolerance and influence). In this manner, the institutes are a reflection of China's desire for a well-received image abroad.

### **Confucius Institutes**

While CIs are a relatively recent mechanism for teaching Chinese abroad, the state has pursued overseas Chinese language instruction for more than two decades. The National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (NOTCFL), or Hanban, was established in 1987. Later, in 2004, the 'Chinese Bridge' Project was approved by China's State Council, which constitutes Hanban's primary mission.<sup>19</sup> The project outlined eight goals, including: founding Confucius Institutes (CIs) abroad, producing 'Great Wall Chinese' and 'Chengo Chinese' (technology-based resources for Chinese language learning), launching Advanced Placement Chinese in 2,500 American institutions, aiding foreign universities in developing Chinese language libraries, and raising college level language proficiency.<sup>20</sup>

Since inception, issues pertaining to CIs have graced the pages of official government documents, such as the National Outline for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development (2010-2020), the Ministry of Education's current ten-year plan. Revising the teaching at CIs is articulated as a necessary undertaking for advancing CIs in the plan. A section titled "Major Projects and Pilot Reform Projects" mentions devoting resources to the

---

<sup>18</sup> Sheng Ding and Robert A. Saunders, "Talking Up China: An Analysis of China's Rising Cultural Power and Global Promotion of the Chinese Language." *East Asia* (Summer 2006), accessed January 5, 2017

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> "Eight Measures to Boost Overseas Chinese Teaching: Official." China Education and Research Network, June 17 2005, accessed October 24, 2016

establishment of CIs.<sup>21</sup> The existence of deliberate attention to Confucius Institutes within official Chinese archives with inclusion of clearly defined goals for institute improvement illuminates the significant position CIs occupy within Chinese policy planning; the act of recording objectives for CIs substantiates their value. It also exhibits the state's role in establishing CIs.

### **Purpose of the Institutes**

Hanban has explicitly stated several CI aims under the “general principles” section of the “Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes.” As enumerated, the intentions are as follows:

Confucius Institutes devote themselves to satisfying the demands of people from different countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese language, to enhancing understanding of the Chinese language and culture by these peoples, to strengthening educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other countries, to deepening friendly relationships with other nations, to promoting the development of multiculturalism, and to construct a harmonious world.<sup>22</sup>

From language such as ‘enhancing understanding’ and ‘deepening friendly relationships,’ it can be inferred China is concerned with cultivating shared positive sentiment and tolerance, which parallels its broader foreign policy. The language used is quite revealing of Hanban’s goals; all statements begin with an affirmative, active verb that presumably will effect positive change, such as ‘satisfy,’ and ‘strengthen.’ The language of the goals was a success for image – none of the statements appear ill-intentioned or harmful; they seem to speak to the desire for global improvement and shared progress. According to the Ministry of Culture, teaching Chinese language in foreign countries “is of strategic significance...to enhance the friendship and mutual

---

<sup>21</sup> Hartig Falk, “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China,” *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 62, (2012), accessed January 3, 2017

<sup>22</sup> “Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes,” [http://english.hanban.org/node\\_7880.htm](http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm), accessed January 6, 2017



understanding as well as the economic and cultural co-operation and exchanges between China and...the world and to elevate China's influence in the international community.”<sup>23</sup>

Various Chinese authorities echo this message. According to the CI chief executive, Xu Lin, rather than wielding soft power, China ‘hopes to be truly understood by the rest of the world.’” Vice Premier of the State Council of China, Liu Yandong, urged CIs to continue “[helping] more foreigners to understand China” during her speech celebrating the tenth anniversary of the institutes. This emphasis on the need for foreign actors to ‘understand’ China illuminates a fundamental Chinese belief: people living in states other than China lack proper information and misunderstand China, which must therefore explain their negative view of the country.<sup>24</sup> Some scholars interpret CIs, and China's public diplomacy, as attempting to showcase a “*politically correct* China to the world,” rather than the “*real* China.”<sup>25</sup> From this perspective, the discrepancy between the ‘real’ and the ‘correct’ China (assuming they are not one in the same) portrayed to the international community “limits their ability to project China's strategic narratives effectively and increase China's soft power.”<sup>26</sup> The disconnect between the authentic and advertised suggests a certain set of political ambitions, namely, to promote an image that will be well received by the targeted audience.

### **‘C’ is for Confucius**

‘Traditional’ has increasingly become the Chinese government's culture of choice. This is related to the rhetoric inspired by China's recent economic development. China adopted order and harmony, integral components of Confucian thought, as essential principles to ease the social

---

<sup>23</sup> Falk Hartig, “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China,” 69.

<sup>24</sup> Falk Hartig, “Communicating China to the World: Confucius Institutes and China's Strategic Narratives,” *Politics* 35, No 3-4. (2015), accessed January 3, 2017

<sup>25</sup> Falk Hartig, “New Public Diplomacy Meets Old Public Diplomacy - the Case of China and Its Confucius Institutes,” *New Global Studies* 8, no. 3 (2014): 348, accessed January 3, 2017

<sup>26</sup> Falk Hartig, “Communicating China to the World: Confucius Institutes and China's Strategic Narratives,” 246.

transformations that ensued simultaneously with economic growth. Similarly, language adopted during China's development, such as 'peaceful rise,' 'harmonious world,' and 'lying low' is consistent with Confucian ideology.<sup>27</sup> The Chinese government embraced the words 'peace' and 'harmony' and equivalent adjectives to project a non-threatening visage to the international stage. Thus, the choice of Confucius as the namesake for the institutes is also intimately related to endeavors to manage global perception, as the tranquil connotations associated with Confucius mirror China's desired portrayal abroad.

Furthermore, Confucius has brand name recognition. Foreigners recognize 'Confucius' even if their knowledge of China is otherwise limited. Other interpretations of the use of Confucius include the interplay between traditional facets of culture and the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and Xi Jinping's government. From the CPC's point of view, the party should be accepted because the morals it currently adheres to originated thousands of years ago; the CPC thereby elevates the character and reputation of the regime.<sup>28</sup> This is intriguing, considering the Maoist ideology that established the CPC regarded Confucianism as its antithesis, and actively sought to weaken the presence of Confucius's followers. Subsequently, some experts in the field of international relations find the party's turn to Confucian ideology contradictory and perhaps even hypocritical, which may contribute to cases of suspicion of the shift in cultural attitude.

### **Structure and Set-up**

Hanban constitutes the Confucius Institute Headquarters, and consists of officials from twelve central government ministries. The Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters oversees it. The Council includes fifteen council members (ten of which must be Heads of CI

---

<sup>27</sup> Xiaolin Guo, "Repackaging Confucius: PRC Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Soft Power"

<sup>28</sup> Chris Buckley, "Leader Taps into Chinese Classics in Seeking to Cement Power," *New York Times*, October 11, 2014, accessed November 3, 2016

Boards of Directors abroad), executive council members, vice chairs and a chair.<sup>29</sup> Hanban manages the founding, funding, and networking of institutes.

Seoul, South Korea enjoys the distinction of having the first CI; it was established in November of 2004. In the initial few years, CIs grew rapidly. On average in 2006, one institute sprung up every four days.<sup>30</sup> Growth has declined since then. There are currently 500 Confucius Institutes and 1000 Confucius Classrooms worldwide. Institutes typically serve a university community, while select institutes only serve business professionals. Classrooms are typically associated with primary and secondary schools. Some universities offer credit for courses taken at the institute, while others do not. The most common form of operation is a joint endeavor; the foreign university is responsible for the facilities and a local director, while a partner Chinese university provides a co-director and teachers (who are not always available).<sup>31</sup> Hanban sends textbooks and financial support to the institute. Both partners are expected to invest in the CI. It is common for Hanban and the local university to fund the CI at a 1:1 ratio. Originally, Hanban anticipated CIs to inevitably fund themselves, but Hanban has since accepted the need (demonstrated by the universities) to continue providing long-term financial support to CIs.

Some compare CIs to the British Council, the Goethe Institute, the Cervantes Institute or the Alliance Française, international education institutes established by other nations. However, a notable difference in these entities is their structure. The institutes founded by European countries are not tied to other bodies in the local community in which they're established. CIs on

---

<sup>29</sup> “About Us - Confucius Institute Headquarters,” english.Hanban.org, accessed February 1, 2017, [http://english.hanban.org/node\\_7716.htm](http://english.hanban.org/node_7716.htm).

<sup>30</sup> R.S. Zaharna et al., *Confucius Institutes and the Globalization of China's Soft Power*, (Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa Press, 2014).

<sup>31</sup> The motivation for a Chinese university to participate in the program lies in the perception within China of various institutions of higher education. The prevalence of ‘international exchanges’ is a marker for evaluation; a university with a greater frequency and variety of international partnerships and opportunities is perceived as more credible. For more information see: Xiaolin Guo, “Repackaging Confucius: PRC Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Soft Power”

the other hand, are founded in conjunction with a local organization (most often a university), have a Chinese university partner. Both are connected to the headquarters in Beijing, and in effect, the Chinese state. The European counterparts do not have a similar relationship to their governing bodies.<sup>32</sup> The partnerships CIs employ create a “multi-dimensional, multi-layered global network structure.” For some scholars, this ‘linking,’ not the sheer number of institutes, is the source of soft power.<sup>33</sup>

## Critiques

Various criticisms of CIs have been written, regarding a dearth of teachers, and a teaching quality that leaves students wanting. A strong teaching force is required to achieve successful results with such a large initiative. Some identify an unmet need of Chinese instructors as a lack of enthusiasm among Chinese university professors to teach abroad, possibly because CI instructors do not receive additional financial support or experience that would warrant promotion. Certain teachers have also expressed reservations about travelling to countries of which they are less familiar. In response to this instructor deficit, Hanban has recruited Chinese people abroad to serve as language teachers. The main issue highlighted by this procedure is the lack of identical teaching abilities between the recruited teachers abroad with those of ‘certified Chinese language instructors’ found at Chinese universities.<sup>34</sup>

In addition to a general shortage of instructors, a deficiency of staff skilled in speaking local, non-English languages has also received negative publicity. Similarly, certain resources Hanban provides are only in English, which can prove difficult to use in non-English speaking countries. Other complaints about textbooks include their portrayal of China. Newer textbooks

---

<sup>32</sup> Falk Hartig, “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China”

<sup>33</sup> R.S. Zaharna, *Confucius Institutes and the Globalization of China's Soft Power*

<sup>34</sup> Zhenjie Yuan, et al., “Confucius Institutes and the Limitations of China's Global Cultural Network.” *China Information* 30 no. 3 (2016), accessed January 4, 2017

written in the 2000s contain a positive depiction of Chinese people with decreased mention of and minimization of social struggles, while those of the 1990s describe more unfavorable social phenomenon.<sup>35</sup> This exhibits a shift in the narrative China wishes to portray.

The Language Law of the People's Republic of China (2000) dictates that foreigners being taught the Chinese language will be instructed in Putonghua and 'standard' characters.<sup>36</sup> Certain scholars are critical of this requirement, perceiving it as harmful to a student's language acquisition. Most literature relating to Confucianism and classical texts are written in traditional characters. Moreover, the following are often written in traditional characters: texts published in Taiwan and Hong Kong – somewhat outside the realm of pressure which might be applied by the Chinese party, and scholarly debates on current events that are censored in mainland China. The few works predating the 1950's that have an edition in simplified characters which are the 'standard' characters prescribed by the Language Law typically include interpretations that align with the accepted party stance on the topic. Thus, it is argued that foreigners learning the Chinese language should recognize traditional characters, which are relevant to and crucial for a comprehensive understanding of China.<sup>37</sup> Despite the aforementioned limitations (which are discussed most commonly in the West), the case study will demonstrate that Confucius Institutes are undoubtedly an expression of Chinese soft power in Kenya.

## **Concluding Remarks**

Confucius Institutes are a deliberate effort made by the PRC under the umbrella of its foreign policy goals of achieving mutually beneficial cooperation and a more accepted image abroad. CIs are intriguing for their interplay between private and public actors across political

---

<sup>35</sup> Falk Hartig, "Communicating China to the World: Confucius Institutes and China's Strategic Narratives"

<sup>36</sup> Putonghua is the official language of Mainland China. The CPC mandates the use of standard characters, while the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan uses 'traditional' characters.

<sup>37</sup> Michael Churchman. 2011. "Confucius Institutes and Controlling Chinese Languages," *China Heritage Quarterly* no. 26 (June 2011), accessed January 4, 2017

and cultural borders. There are currently forty-six CIs and eleven Confucius Classrooms on the African continent. In the following chapter, this author will establish a theoretical framework, which will then be used to discuss Confucius Institutes in Kenya and the significance for Chinese soft power and China's engagement with Africa.

## Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework

Culture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall strength... We must enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people's basic cultural rights and interests. – President Hu Jintao to the 17<sup>th</sup> CPC Congress<sup>38</sup>

This chapter outlines common understandings of soft power in the Western and Chinese contexts. It also outlines the definitions of soft power that will be used in the case study analysis.

### Soft Power

Joseph S. Nye originally coined the term 'soft power' in 1990. Thereafter, pundits and politicians have debated the essence of soft power. According to Nye, the soft power of a nation consists of three pillars: "its culture (when it is pleasing to others), its values (when they are attractive and consistently practiced), and its policies (when they are seen as inclusive and legitimate)."<sup>39</sup> The essence of this "co-optive power is the ability of a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own."<sup>40</sup>

Soft power is the antithesis to hard power, but does not constitute the totality of things that fall outside the realm of hard power. Military and economic factors are principal elements of hard power, and its primary tools include physical force, payments, sanctions, and bribes.<sup>41</sup> Hard power is able to "rest on inducements ('carrots') or threats ('sticks')" whereas soft power "co-opts people rather than coerces them." Economic might demonstrated through sanctions is not soft power. Examples of non-coercive military resources that may augment a nation's soft power include an impressive military reputation, training programs, and cooperation that engenders

---

<sup>38</sup> Hu Jintao quoted in Sheng Ding, "Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: A New Look at China's Rise to the Status Quo Power," 264.

<sup>39</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Get Smart," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 4 (July/August 2009), accessed October 18, 2016.

<sup>40</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy* no. 80 (Autumn 1990): 168, accessed November 18, 2016

<sup>41</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to success in World Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004).

transnational connections.<sup>42</sup> Soft power differs from hard power in regards to implementation as well. Hard power requires government involvement – national resources are used to carry out coercive actions chosen by the government. Contrarily, soft power develops naturally, independent of the political bureaucracy. It can be generated within society by popular culture. Moreover, the two forms of power do not depend on one another. Nations are capable of performing excellently when it comes to one type of power, and falling short in terms of the other.<sup>43</sup>

For some, the dialogue transcends both hard and soft power. The effective integration of the two forms of power is referred to as ‘smart power,’ which is a popular buzzword for commentaries on security and security policy. Proponents of smart power contend there are certain situations which cannot be resolved by military action alone, and thereby necessitate a skillful utilization of multiple means to achieve persuasion. One such situation would be nuclear deproliferation.<sup>44</sup> In this case, it may not be necessary to completely dissect the blurred lines between hard and soft power, because the two act together.

An important distinction made by Nye is the mutually exclusive relationship between soft power outcomes and its resources. Soft power is the effect nations seek, whereas soft power resources are solely the means to that end. Such “official instruments of soft power” include “public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief, [and] military-to-military contacts.”<sup>45</sup> He notes certain scholars mistake soft power for the resources used to achieve it because it is an intangible concept, and resources such as population and military strength offer a more concrete basis for understanding power. He maintains that

---

<sup>42</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., “The War on Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy* (2011).

<sup>43</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*

<sup>44</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Security and Smart Power,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 51 no. 9 (May 2008), accessed October 18, 2016.

<sup>45</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Get Smart”



scholars who believe hard power can be measured while soft power cannot are mistaken. Soft power resources can indeed be quantified.<sup>46</sup> However, possessing resources with soft power potential does not necessarily mean a nation will achieve its desired objective. In order to “[convert] resources into realized power, in the sense of obtaining desired outcomes requires well-designed strategies and skillful leadership.”<sup>47</sup> Therefore, there exists a bridge between efforts towards soft power goals, and the realization of soft power, creating a disconnect, and making it possible for scholars to disagree regarding definitional boundaries of soft power, which in turn shapes the dialogue on its applications and limitations.

Critics of soft power do not necessarily adhere to the definition of the term as it was at the time of its inception, stating that it includes “*all* facets of [a nation’s] national strength *except* the ‘hard power’ associated with military coercion”<sup>48</sup> This is exactly the misconception of soft power Nye describes. These variations require the reader to remain cognizant of the definition provided in the discussion at hand, and take it into consideration when absorbing the evaluation of soft power given. When discussing the Western conceptualization of soft power, this thesis refers to co-optive power that develops naturally in society, without direct involvement of the political bureaucracy. It also does not include economic or military factors.

### **Soft Power in the Chinese Context**

Soft power ideas have existed in China since ancient times. Sun Tzu, the popular thinker, valued diplomacy over armed conflict. *Bound to Lead*, Nye’s book on soft power, was translated into Chinese in 1992. Chinese scholarship discussing the concept referred to soft power as

---

<sup>46</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Think Again: Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy*, (2006).

<sup>47</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 184.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

‘mental power,’ whereas hard power was ‘material power.’<sup>49</sup> When discussing China’s use of soft power, authors address the issue of defining soft power and assess its limits and applications. The existing literature on China’s initiatives is composed of vast disagreements concerning the definition of its efforts, but it is rather lacking in comprehensive case studies of specific examples of soft power. There is disagreement about whether the original definition proposed by Nye should be used, or if the concept of soft power should be altered to suit the ‘Chinese context,’ which would entail integrating Western theory with Chinese practice. Varying definitions of soft power as it is applied to the Chinese case are present within Western scholarship, and across Western and Chinese literature. The differences in term usage are important because they denote which efforts and data can be used in an analysis of Chinese soft power. Grasping the intricacies of this debate will inform one’s understanding of the conceptual divide in the existing scholarship and which topics would profit from further exploration.

China discerns soft power and public diplomacy initiatives largely as a means of “[internationalizing] the voice of China so that it penetrates into popular consciousness and influences policy communities debating the consequences of China’s rise.”<sup>50</sup> This perspective gives way to the belief that soft power necessitates active promotion, rather than reliance on an innate quality possessed by the nation, thus leading to the state-run nature of China’s efforts.<sup>51</sup> Due to the PRC’s approach attempting to counteract a certain international perception, most scholars view Chinese efforts as rather reactive, instead of proactive.<sup>52</sup>

---

<sup>49</sup> Sheng Ding, “Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: A New Look at China’s Rise to the Status Quo Power,” 263.

<sup>50</sup> Shaun Breslin, “The Soft Notion of China’s ‘Soft Power,’” Chatham House. (February 2011): 6-7, accessed November 3, 2016

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Bonnie S. Glaser and Melissa E. Murphy, “Soft Power With Chinese Characteristics: The Ongoing Debate,” Center for Strategic International Studies, (March 10 2009), accessed November 17, 2016

Public diplomacy is typically understood as an instrument for achieving soft power outcomes. As it is understood in Chinese, it is a misnomer for the accepted interpretation in English. Wang Yiwei, a leading Chinese scholar of international affairs, notes that more often the phrase used in China translates as ‘external propaganda,’ where ‘propaganda’ lacks the negative connotation associated with its English-language counterpart, and takes on a meaning more similar to ‘advertising.’ The Chinese notion of public diplomacy further differs from that of the U.S. in that the Chinese conception of ‘public’ implies the domestic population, and thereby necessitates that the same bodies targeting audiences abroad also reach out to the Chinese public.<sup>53</sup> For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses ‘public diplomacy’ when referring to visits to the ministry, online discussions, and lectures, all of which target Chinese citizens.<sup>54</sup> This method of governing stems from China’s political structure, as it does not possess a single entity charged with public diplomacy objectives, and does not have an identical position to the undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs as in the United States. There is a fragmented quality to diplomacy within the Chinese governing system. For example, cultural diplomacy is overseen by the Ministry of Culture, whereas the State Council and Foreign Affairs Department’s International Office controls media diplomacy.<sup>55</sup> Additionally, people-to-people diplomacy is an integral component of the Chinese take on public diplomacy. Intergovernmental communication conducted in a formal manner is the mainstay of Chinese foreign policy.<sup>56</sup>

China’s public diplomacy tailors strategically determined topics towards particular ‘target groups’ on a regional basis. Campaigns regarding human rights are aimed at Europe and the United States, as this has historically been a topic of concern for those regions. The dialogue on a

---

<sup>53</sup> Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power”

<sup>54</sup> Ingrid d’Hooghe, “The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations”

<sup>55</sup> Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power”

<sup>56</sup> Ingrid d’Hooghe, “The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations”

‘peaceful rise’ is spread throughout Asia so as to mitigate concerns of potential aggression.

People of Chinese heritage living abroad are also a ‘target group,’ as China aspires to advertise Chinese culture and support their political interests through these people.<sup>57</sup>

One scholar notes that when contemplating Chinese soft power, observers on the outside looking in often analyze economic relations in addition to other components traditionally understood as falling under the hard power classification.<sup>58</sup> When scholars view the topic from a standpoint in which the ends of soft power are considered more important than the means, the possession of influence is more consequential to the discussion than the methods engaged to achieve the result. The implication here is that because China is achieving the outcome it desires (positive foreign opinions of the nation), economic capacity may be considered a form of soft power (despite the original classification of economic ‘carrots’ as hard power). Joshua Kurlantzick adheres to this broad definition of the concept as it is applied in the case of China, noting that it “implies all elements outside of the security realm, including investment and aid.”<sup>59</sup> This thesis will employ a similar definition of soft power in the Chinese context that includes aid and investment.

Certain Western scholars take issue with the obscure relationship between public diplomacy and soft power in China. Their position holds the following: rather than using public diplomacy to promote what has been developed “organically” within society, the “Chinese government wants to sell its own message.” In this way, there is a “gap between the message they might want to promulgate and reality of society on the ground,” which would imply that

---

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Shaun Breslin, “The Soft Notion of China’s ‘Soft Power’”

<sup>59</sup> Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,” 1.

China is not exercising soft power in the traditionally understood sense.<sup>60</sup> Other Western scholars echo this interpretation, implying China is employing a “governmental level public diplomacy program” instead of soft power.<sup>61</sup> This line of reasoning implies the influence China does have on the international community is not engendered by “sociocultural capital,” but rather its source is “proactive diplomacy.”<sup>62</sup> According to this perspective, China’s soft power agenda should instead employ a “passive” initiative that excludes anything put forth by the state.<sup>63</sup> However, as Chinese soft power is situated within the context of the state’s foreign policy, this thesis will not exclude government-backed programs from the definition of soft power.

### **Commonly Used Evidence**

When the conceptual perspectives on soft power differ between Chinese and Western thinkers, contrasting evaluations of their performance in these matters will arise. In spite of this disagreement on the precise definition of soft power in the case of China, many scholars use similar examples in their discussion, one of which is the media. In fact, media analyses compose the vast majority of in-depth examinations of China’s soft power. China has invested billions of dollars in transforming *Xinhua News Agency*, its official news outlet, China Central Television (CCTV), and other Chinese broadcasting into media sources that reach the international community.<sup>64</sup> The State Council Information Office alone spends \$10 billion annually on propaganda outside of China.<sup>65</sup> A common observation is: China is looking to improve its standing in the ‘discourse wars’ – information spread globally that can have a positive or

---

<sup>60</sup> Elizabeth Economy, “China Power: Unpacking the Complexity of China’s Rise.” *Is China’s Soft Power Strategy Working?* Center for Strategic and International Studies. Video. Accessed October 12, 2016

<sup>61</sup> David Shambaugh, “China Power: Unpacking the Complexity of China’s Rise,” *Is China’s Soft Power Strategy Working?* Center for Strategic and International Studies. Video. Accessed October 12, 2016

<sup>62</sup> Richard Heydarian, “Is China’s Soft Power Bubble About to Burst?” *National Interest*, (August 25 2015), Accessed October 13, 2016

<sup>63</sup> Shaun Breslin, “The Soft Notion of China’s ‘Soft Power’”

<sup>64</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., “China Power: Unpacking the Complexity of China’s Rise.” *Is China’s Soft Power Strategy Working?* Center for Strategic and International Studies. Video. Accessed October 12, 2016

<sup>65</sup> Richard Heydarian, “Is China’s Soft Power Bubble About to Burst?”

negative effect on China, depending on whether it depicts China's rise as a threat or not.

Consequently, the typical analysis is China is seeking to balance the Western media's projection of them, especially in developing countries, and particularly through *Xinhua*.<sup>66</sup> In this manner, media campaigns are intimately related to foreign policy goals of improving its image. The general consensus on the push for a global Chinese media is that they are not meeting expectations and are not a beneficial use of resources. As Confucius Institutes are also concerned with image management, the case study will provide an interesting source for comparison with the pre-existing media analyses.

Other examples of soft power given are the allure of the 'Beijing Consensus,' China's political and economic model,<sup>67</sup> as well as their rapidly increasing participation in international institutions<sup>68</sup> and regional security organizations,<sup>69</sup> such as their involvement with the WTO and the troops they have sent on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. Evidence about aid is used in accordance with scholars' definition of soft power – those who consider these 'carrots' as soft power resources are apt to use them in their evaluation.

Many scholars cite political practices and domestic issues as a challenge to China's soft power. This reasoning postulates China's practices do not align with those in the West, violating the condition for soft power that a nation's political values and actions be attractive to foreign nations, thereby limiting their soft power.<sup>70</sup> One example of a phenomenon regarded as acceptable in China's political realm, yet reprehensible by Western standards, is censorship. The Chinese government's blatant use of censorship is distressing to Western nations, and as such,

---

<sup>66</sup> David Shambaugh, "China's Soft Power Push: The Search for Respect," *Foreign Affairs* 94, no. 4 (July/August 2015), Accessed October 11, 2016

<sup>67</sup> This term emerged as a play on the Western 'Washington Consensus,' which established paradigmatic economic practices and international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF.

<sup>68</sup> Huang, Yanzhong and Ding, Sheng, "Dragon's Underbelly: An Analysis of China's Soft Power," *East Asia* (Winter 2006). Accessed November 10, 2016

<sup>69</sup> Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, "Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power'"

<sup>70</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Rise of China's Soft Power"

has a repelling, as opposed to an attractive, effect. Moreover, some scholars contend that censorship inhibits soft power in more than a definitional sense; it limits creativity,<sup>71</sup> which some view as necessary to the development of a civil society that would exhibit soft power naturally and draw foreign publics to its popular culture. d’Hooghe concludes that “China seems trapped between its aim at perfection in image projection and the structural lack of openness of its society, as well as its inability to give up control.”<sup>72</sup>

Others claim that the role of the state is helpful in mechanism, but harmful in its results; an authoritarian state can be more successful in its strategic use of soft power “because its leaders, diplomats, and bureaucrats can be more focused and unified in formulating and implementing their policies toward the target state.”<sup>73</sup> Despite this advantage in method, Beijing’s amicable attitude towards dictators in developing nations and “lack of meaningful political reform” nevertheless weakens their soft power capacity with liberal democracies.<sup>74</sup> These relationships and political status engender concerns about legitimacy.<sup>75</sup> In response to the lack of global popularity for China’s authoritarian practices, the notion of ‘selling their history’ is relevant.<sup>76</sup> Some Chinese and Western scholars argue that the PRC’s most promising method of promoting itself includes its economic record and traditional culture.<sup>77</sup> Chinese scholars advocate Chinese soft power to emphasize “core values of socialism” and traditional cultural values, particularly Confucianism.<sup>78</sup>

---

<sup>71</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., “China’s Soft Power Deficit.” *The Wall Street Journal*, (May 8 2012), Accessed October 24, 2016

<sup>72</sup> Ingrid d’Hooghe, “The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations,” 102.

<sup>73</sup> Yanzhong Huang and Sheng Ding, “Dragon’s Underbelly: An Analysis of China’s Soft Power,” 34-35.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, 40.

<sup>75</sup> Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power’”

<sup>76</sup> “Sun Tzu and the Art of Soft Power,” *The Economist*, (December 17 2011), Accessed October 24, 2016

<sup>77</sup> d’Hooghe, “The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations”

<sup>78</sup> Osamu Sayama, “China’s Approach to Soft Power: Seeking a Balance between Nationalism, Legitimacy, and International Influence.” Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, (March 2016), Accessed October 23, 2016

## Concluding Remarks

Thus far, media portrayals have received the most attention in analyses of China's soft power, while other potential resources of soft power have not been sufficiently explored in a similar manner. Perhaps it is the intangible nature of soft power that inhibits an in-depth examination of its application. As such, it would be useful to investigate further to gain insight into China's soft power performance and its influence in the world.

Although scholars have not arrived at a universal consensus on the definitions of soft power and public diplomacy, both in general and in the specific context of China, it is clear that the concepts are relevant to a discourse on cultural promotion. This chapter, in conjunction with the introductory material outlining China's foreign policy strategy, forms the 'soft power in the Chinese context' definition that will be used for this thesis: soft power is a broad tool employed in hopes of achieving China's overarching foreign policy goals of being accepted in international relations and regaining great power status. Soft power is both impacted by China's international image, and its intended use is to improve this image. It is generally accepted from a Chinese point of view that soft power relates to culture, which is a contributing factor to comprehensive national power. If hard power is understood as continuous, then soft power is a "variable or multiplier, which could magnify comprehensive power or significantly weaken it."<sup>79</sup> The two forms of power work as an integrated team; together they constitute a holistic indication of a nation's power. Also important for this thesis is the view among Chinese scholars that "if 'China opportunity' can outweigh 'China threat,' then China can effectively wield soft power to achieve its desired policy outcomes."<sup>80</sup>

---

<sup>79</sup> Bonnie S. Glaser and Melissa E. Murphy, "Soft Power With Chinese Characteristics: The Ongoing Debate," 19-20.

<sup>80</sup> Sheng Ding, *The Dragon's Hidden Wings: How China Rises With its Soft Power*, 25.



The reader should then conceptualize Confucius Institutes as a component of China's overarching soft power goals and policies, i.e., a tool for China to achieve its foreign policy objectives. This definition of soft power in the Chinese context is more expansive and fluid than the traditional Western definition (which excludes economic and military factors, and top-down governmental actions).

Numerous scholars believe China has yet to effectively wield soft power. Much attention is given to its supposed limits. Despite critical evaluations of China's pre-existing track record, a typical prediction is that their soft power performance will improve in the future.<sup>81</sup> In order to achieve this, scholars recommend China move away from a top-down approach, and allow civil society to do the work naturally. This thesis also concludes China's soft power has room for improvement, but for different reasons that will be explored in the case study.

This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework that will be used for discussion. Within the Kenyan case study, the thesis will primarily analyze Confucius Institutes according to the above definition of soft power in the Chinese context. The thesis will also make use of a stricter interpretation of soft power in line with its traditional Western definition for comparison.

---

<sup>81</sup> Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, "Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power'"

### Chapter Three: Kenya

[The] cultural foray points to a bigger agenda of inculcating young minds into the Chinese life, heritage, culture and language. The vibrant student exchange programme and scholarships exposes African students to an alternative lifestyle, with the end game being adoption of Chinese culture which in turn fuels uptake of products from the Asian giant.<sup>82</sup>

While some views may be quite passionate such as this one, others in Kenya are more welcoming towards engagement with China. By looking at Sino-Kenyan relations at large, and Confucius Institutes on the ground, this chapter will argue that perspective informs one's interpretation of the activity of CIs, and consequently, one's perception of China's soft power.

Kenya gained independence from Britain in 1963. Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, was present for the independence celebrations, and official Sino-Kenyan relations were established a few days later. In 1966, Joseph Murumbi, Kenya's Vice President shaped key foreign policy goals. The objectives Murumbi outlined, which have continued to the present include: non-alignment, non-interference in others' internal affairs, recognition of other states' territory, and peaceful coexistence. Afro-Asian partnerships and cooperation that occurred in the 1950's are responsible for the aforementioned policies' remarkable likeness to Chinese policy.<sup>83</sup>

Sino-Kenyan relations were in flux for the second half of the twentieth century. Bilateral ties were dependent on Kenya's domestic political climate, as well as the international power structure. The Sino-Soviet split in 1963 and Cultural Revolution in China led to a less active Chinese presence in African affairs. Domestically, Kenya contained competing political factions. The ruling power, Jomo Kenyatta and the Kenya African National Union (KANU), perceived China's international support for a revolutionary spirit as a threat, citing China as the inspiration for recent assassinations and coups. Consequently, the quality of bilateral relations deteriorated.

---

<sup>82</sup> "China's Incursion in Kenya's Higher Education: Partner or Patron?," *Capital Campus*, April 17, 2013, accessed March 9, 2017, <http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/campus/chinas-incursion-in-kenyas-higher-education-partner-or-patron/>

<sup>83</sup> Anita C. Wheeler, "China's Public Diplomacy in Kenya: the Case of Chinese Language and Cultural Programs at the University of Nairobi Confucius Institute," (Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest, 2012), 66-70.

Despite the turbulence, 1971 brought Kenya's official recognition of the PRC as the sole Chinese government, with their vote in favor of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution outlining the PRC's status as the legitimate government of China. Relations improved following President Moi's trip to Peking in 1980. Chinese leaders lauded Moi for maintaining Kenyan independence from superpowers, whereas Kenyan officials highlighted the potential development to be achieved from partnership with China.<sup>84</sup>

### **Kenya's Value as a Case Study**

The Chinese Embassy in Kenya states that it "remains firmly committed to fulfill its duty to promote the mutual understanding, friendly exchanges and win-win cooperation between China and Kenya."<sup>85</sup> This language highlights the state's role in achieving its overarching goal of 'understanding,' but what draws China specifically to Kenya? Oil reserves were not discovered there until 2012.<sup>86</sup> While China may have since revised their approach, oil was not a directly contributing factor when Kenya's first CI was established in 2005. As China has a glaring need to import oil, one wonders why it would become invested in a country incapable of exporting the resource. China's interest in Kenya may therefore be reflective of the broader CI goal of revising China's international image and promoting friendly relationships.

Other than China's desire for international acceptance, certain characteristics of Kenya may further explain China's interest for managing their image within and building partnerships with this specific African country as well. Perhaps most importantly, the Mombasa Port, and Kenya's coastal location in general, is of strategic interest to China. It provides access to markets

---

<sup>84</sup> Anita C. Wheeler, "China's Public Diplomacy in Kenya," 72-78.

<sup>85</sup> H.E. Liu Guangyuan, "From Giraffe the Diplomat to 'Peace Ark,'" Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Kenya, October 11, 2010, accessed February 27, 2017, <http://ke.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t760005.htm>.

"Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Kenya – About the Embassy – Ambassador Liu Xianfa," accessed February 27, 2017, <http://ke.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxx/lxfds/>.

<sup>86</sup> "Oil Discovered in Kenya for the First Time," *Washington Times*, March 26, 2012, accessed March 11, 2017, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/26/oil-discovered-in-kenya-for-first-time/>.

in central Africa, allowing China to trade with landlocked countries and expand its export destination base. The port is a direct point of access to routes reaching the inner portions of Kenya and surrounding countries (for a map, see Appendix). Kenya is purportedly the “African hub for the OBOR initiative,” China’s One Belt, One Road infrastructure project connecting and establishing trade routes through railroads and ports from Asia to Europe.<sup>87</sup> OBOR was conceived to expand trade, seek new avenues for growth, and to broaden China’s global influence. The Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), a major transportation project connecting Mombasa to Nairobi (to be completed in 2017), is considered a key component of Africa’s future participation in increased trade brought by OBOR, as the East African Community (EAC) consists of 93 million consumers. Kenya is therefore geographically crucial to China’s economic goals. In addition to China’s desired positive image that would allow it to hold an agenda-setting role internationally, China most likely aims to establish and perpetuate cordial ties specifically with Kenya through the Confucius Institutes to maintain Kenya as a trading partner. Kenya’s location may explain why it is home to four CIs, much more than the typical zero or one, or occasional two, for African countries.

Additionally, Kenya is the largest east African economy, and the largest importer and exporter. Within the EAC the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) is comparatively secure and diverse. Kenya’s GDP constitutes 40% of the region’s overall GDP. Kenya’s overall economic health seemingly has a direct influence on that of its neighbors, and likewise, its progress will have positive ramifications for the region as a whole. Kenya is one of two nations in the region

---

<sup>87</sup> Dominic Omondi, “Why SGR is a Tiny Part in China’s Game Plan to Become Superpower,” *Standard Digital*, January 22, 2017, accessed April 20, 2017, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000230796/why-sgr-is-a-tiny-part-in-china-s-game-plan-to-become-superpower>

that is not hindered in international trade due to a landlocked position.<sup>88</sup> Kenya's role in the regional economy makes it an attractive trading partner. Establishing congenial relations would have obvious trade-related benefits.

Trade relations are an integral driving force behind Kenya's engagement with China as well. Kenya began pursuing a 'look East' policy in 2003 in order to decrease and de-emphasize reliance on Western markets. Subsequently, economic policy has become a considerable component of Kenya's foreign policy.<sup>89</sup> The Kenyan government's Vision 2030 development program, envisioned in 2008, targets becoming a middle-income country by 2030. The goal also includes a 10% growth rate annually, highlighting the importance of FDI from China.<sup>90</sup> Government officials impress the significance of education to economic prosperity. Of the launching of the CI in Nairobi, Kilemi Miria, the Kenyan Assistant Minister for Education provided a key insight into the Kenyan government's attitude towards the CI, stating:

Our government believes very strongly that investment in education and training contributes significantly to economic growth and labor productivity. Indeed the skills and knowledge gained through education are fundamental in achieving not only the ambitions of the individuals in the knowledge-based economy but also in overall national development. It is in the light of this that we believe that the learning of the Chinese language and culture will be instrumental in strengthening a cordial relationship between our two countries.<sup>91</sup>

This statement implies the strength and health of Kenya's economy is related directly to its relationship with China, as it is education, through Chinese language, that will spur growth. In

---

<sup>88</sup> Josephine Kibe and Kimenyi, Mwangi S., "Africa's Powerhouse," Brookings Institution, January 6, 2014, accessed March 11, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/africas-powerhouse/>.  
 Esther Mulinge, "An Analysis of China-Kenya Bilateral Relations on Infrastructure Development," Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, 2012, accessed February 26, 2017, [http://kippra.or.ke/index.php?option=com\\_docman&task=doc\\_view&gid=275&Itemid](http://kippra.or.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=275&Itemid).

<sup>89</sup> Daniel Juma Omondi, "Kenya's Foreign Policy Shift from Political to Economic Diplomacy," University of Nairobi - Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, September 2011, accessed April 26, 2017

<sup>90</sup> Anita C. Wheeler, "China's Public Diplomacy in Kenya," 87.

<sup>91</sup> "First Confucius Institute for Africa Launched in Nairobi," *Xinhua News Agency*, December 20, 2005, accessed January 4, 2017, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/culture/152442.htm.set>.

this capacity, the government's attraction to Mandarin is more an extension of fiscal goals, rather than admiration for the language itself.

The Kenyan government could also be interested in China's image for commercial reasons. China has a clear interest in the manufacturing sector in Kenya. From 2003 to 2015, Chinese firms invested \$296.17 million USD. From Chinese companies, the manufacturing sector received 64% of total investment. However, China has maintained its comparative advantage in manufacturing inexpensive products, and its manufacturing sector has permeated global supply chains more extensively. As a result, Kenya's opportunity for trade growth in relation to China's transition to a consumption-driven economy hinges on exporting tourism and financial services to China. Additionally, 2014 marked 23% of Kenyan imports originating in China.<sup>92</sup> Increased interface, both economically and politically, with a foreign actor can cause social tensions, which may be further exacerbated by domestic disdain for that actor, or a belief that trade is a zero-sum game. Thus, it may be advantageous for Kenya to accentuate China's positives, thereby easing unrest that comes naturally with a perceived external threat the prosperity of domestic industries. Alternatively, it would benefit Kenyan officials to overtly promote policies that demonstrate to Kenyans they are pursuing economic development and national prosperity, one of which is trade relations with China. Either way, trade would conceivably benefit from increased cultural understanding. Aid and development assistance may be a consideration in determining policy as well. Aid accounts for approximately 5-6% of Kenya's income. According to a 2016 report published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Kenya ranked third amongst top Official Development Assistance (ODA) recipients for 2014, with a total of \$2.6 million USD received. The country

---

<sup>92</sup> Apurva Singh and Dylan Johnson, "Deal or No Deal: Strictly Business for China in Kenya?" Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank Group, (March 2016): 4-6; 25, accessed February 21, 2017, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/801581468195561492/pdf/WPS7614.pdf>.

ranked fourth over a three-year average from 2012-2014.<sup>93</sup> From \$26 million USD in 2003 to \$403 million in 2012, FDI in Kenya has risen 35.6% per annum. In 2010, China constituted 57% of Kenya's FDI.<sup>94</sup> This evidence shows that China is heavily involved in Kenya's financial activities. Leading up to the 25<sup>th</sup> African Union Summit in 2015, President Kenyatta remarked:

The future of our continent cannot be left to the good graces of outside interests. Dependency on giving that only appears to be charitable must end. Foreign aid, which so often carries terms and conditions that preclude progress is not an acceptable basis for prosperity and freedom. It is time to give it up.<sup>95</sup>

His message regarding 'terms and conditions' is clearly a reference to Western aid, and implores African countries to abandon reliance on it. This highlights the importance of aid received from China. Engaging with the institutes could be a means of establishing a diplomatic relationship that would ensure continued aid from China. In this way, multiple forms of economic drivers point to a need for Kenya's government officials to seek amiable relations.

Various details about Kenya, and aspects of Sino-Kenyan relations make it an interesting choice for a case study, including: 1) Kenya has quite a few CIs (four), compared to the typical zero, one or two in other African countries 2) despite not being an oil exporting country through the inception and development of CIs in Kenya, China nevertheless pursued partnership with Kenya 3) within the east Africa region, Kenya boasts a strong economy and geographically strategic location 4) while China has experienced past encounters with other African countries, Sino-Kenyan relations stand out as having distinct pivotal events shifting the balance from friendly to unfriendly and vice-a-versa 5) finally, Kenya has vested interests in China, which

---

<sup>93</sup> "Report: Development Aid at a Glance," Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2016, accessed March 11, 2017, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/2%20Africa%20-%20Development%20Aid%20at%20a%20Glance%202016.pdf>.

<sup>94</sup> "Kenya's Uhuru Kenyatta Urges Africa to Give Up Aid," *BBC*, June 12, 2015, accessed March 11, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33108716>.

<sup>95</sup> Apurva Singh and Johnson, Dylan, "Deal or No Deal: Strictly Business for China in Kenya?"

<sup>95</sup> "Kenya's Uhuru Kenyatta Urges Africa to Give Up Aid"

have been expressed by high-level officials. The following section will examine the experience of CIs in Kenya with respect to China's foreign policy goals and conception of soft power.

### **Confucius Institutes in Kenya**

There are four CIs in Kenya:

<b>Kenyan Institution</b>	<b>Year Founded</b>	<b>Chinese Partner Institution</b>
Nairobi University	2005	Tianjin Normal University
Kenyatta University	2008	Shandong Normal University
Egerton University	2012	Nanjing Agricultural University
Moi University	2015	Donghua University <sup>96</sup>

The University of Nairobi (UoN) is home to Kenya's first CI, established in 2005. The outlined goals of the institute are to:

1. Offer innovative and flexible Chinese courses, not only to students, but also to the wider community in Kenya
2. Act as a focal point to support China-related activities in Nairobi and beyond
3. Develop and promote teaching, learning and research on Chinese Studies with University of Nairobi and Kenya
4. Act as a resource center for local professionals teaching Chinese as a foreign language
5. Act as an HSK (Chinese Language Proficiency Examination) center for Chinese language test and preparation
6. Act as a consulting center, providing service to the public and private sectors that will facilitate improved relations and a deepening of economic links between Kenya and China<sup>97</sup>

While the precise language of the mission statement may vary from institute to institute, the message remains rather constant – their goals echo those of the CI 'Constitution and Bylaws,' namely, to enable Chinese instruction and enhance the bilateral relationship. However, the

<sup>96</sup> The author had the pleasure of studying at Donghua in the summer of 2016.

<sup>97</sup> Anita C. Wheeler, "China's Public Diplomacy in Kenya," 136.



objectives of this individual institute venture beyond ‘friendliness’ to address economic considerations as well, which may be indicative of conditions specific to Sino-Kenyan relations and China’s goals in Kenya.

### **Confucius Institutes as Exemplary of Soft Power in the Chinese Context**

Prior to the institute’s opening, the University of Nairobi offered Chinese courses within the Modern Languages and Linguistics department.<sup>98</sup> However, because of the institute, members of the community who are not affiliated with the university are able to enroll in Chinese classes. In 2009, the University of Nairobi’s Communication department absorbed the CI, and a Bachelors degree in Chinese was introduced.<sup>99</sup> Students are also able to earn a certificate in: Elementary Level Chinese (180 hours), Intermediate Level Chinese (90 hours), and Advanced Level Chinese (90 hours). A full sequence consisting of all levels can be completed in four semesters, which qualifies a student for the ‘Chinese Studies’ diploma. The curriculum consists of speaking, reading, listening, and writing. There is also a ‘Chinese Culture Studies’ diploma consisting of ninety hours. Other twenty hour courses offered include subject matter such as: wu shu (traditional Chinese martial arts), painting, calligraphy, tai chi quan (tai chi), business and trade, tourism, and preparation for the HSK. The CI also sponsors extracurricular activities such as Chinese Club, Chinese Choir, Chinese Drama Society, Chinese Corner, dragon and lion dances, and dumpling making. As a result of its excellent performance, the University of Nairobi CI was pronounced “Advanced Confucius Institute.”<sup>100</sup> The UoN CI has shined amongst its peers. It is unclear whether or not this is due to pre-existing conditions in Kenya. Similarly, Kenyatta University (KU) offers: ‘Certificate in Chinese Language and Culture,’ ‘Beginners in

---

<sup>98</sup> Ibid, 119.

<sup>99</sup> Wanjiku J. Mbugua and Peng Yu, “Review and the Outlook of the Development of Chinese Language Education in Kenya,” *Quarterly Journal of Chinese Studies* 3, No 1, (October 2012): 69, accessed March 10, 2017

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

Anita C. Wheeler, “China’s Public Diplomacy in Kenya”

Chinese Language and Culture,’ and ‘Proficiency in Chinese Language and Culture,’ which vary in tuition and length. The ‘Beginners’ course is free to KU students interested in learning elementary Chinese – a helpful step towards providing a wide audience with at least a minimal understanding of China. More recently, a diploma program has been offered for Ksh 98,000. HSK preparation, Chinese calligraphy, cuisine, music, and martial arts are also offered.<sup>101</sup> Most CIs offer enrichment courses such as these that focus on specific aspects of Chinese culture. These cultural snapshots provide succinct exposure to positive elements of China – the components of culture the Chinese government presumably desires foreign students to understand. This is reflective of soft power in the Chinese context for two reasons: 1) it embodies a top-down structure purposefully guiding students’ understanding of China and 2) the classes serve to construct a positive image of China; topics that have historically resulted in a negative view of China are absent.

However, tuition and fee expenses may be limitations to the CIs’ community involvement. Fees potentially inhibit participation of people of lower socioeconomic status, or with other financial priorities. General community members are typically charged more for CI courses than university students and staff. The increased fee imposes a greater barrier to non-students, effectively selecting against the community at large for course population. This could confine outreach to the higher tiers of society, and fail to touch the hearts and minds of an important consumer base of China’s. To address a broader base and enable any member of Kenyan society to fall in love with China’s culture, it would be helpful to reduce or eliminate

---

<sup>101</sup> Wango Kamau, and Li Qiang, “Directors’ Message,” Kenyatta University Confucius Institute, accessed March 11, 2017, <http://www.ku.ac.ke/confucius/index.php/directors-message.html>.

“Kenyatta University Confucius Institute,” accessed March 11, 2017, [http://www.ku.ac.ke/confucius/images/stories/docs/The\\_Confucius\\_Institute\\_Brochure.pdf](http://www.ku.ac.ke/confucius/images/stories/docs/The_Confucius_Institute_Brochure.pdf).

“Diploma in Chinese Language and Culture,” Confucius Institute at Kenyatta University, accessed March 11, 2017, <http://www.ku.ac.ke/confucius/images/stories/docs/Diploma-in-Chinese-Language-and-Culture.pdf>.

tuition fees. However, this may be unsustainable, so an increase in intermittent reduced-cost community outreach programs and events may be desirable.

In addition to comprehensive language and culture provided in relative similarity across all CIs, Kenyan CIs offer areas of expertise found less commonly among other CIs. For example, the Egerton University (EU) CI's emphasis on agricultural training is unique. In 2013, courses with an agriculture focus were added to the institute's repertoire, including Olericulture (vegetable growing), Greenhouse Management, and Crop Protection.<sup>102</sup> Moi University (MU) CI was the first globally to provide a fashion design and textile engineering focus.<sup>103</sup> Personnel at Rivatex, a textile company affiliated with Moi University, participate in language learning in addition to full-time students. The unique variety of programs – agricultural training at Egerton University and textile design at Moi University enhances the depth of exchange. Rather than applying identical curriculum across all CIs, certain CIs are able to provide specialized instruction relevant to the region in which they are based. By adjusting to local needs, CI engagement becomes more of a conversation than a lecture. This diversification among courses is reflective of the mutually beneficial cooperation the PRC seeks; the CI community gains skillsets from industry-specific training, while China garners appreciation for its ability to cater to local needs abroad. Furthermore, this is representative of the development experiences China underwent with Japan that informed its own approach to providing assistance abroad, and consequently, soft power practice. Development assistance is a component of Chinese soft power, which is expressed through training courses at CIs.

---

<sup>102</sup> "NAU Confucius Institute at Egerton University Opens Agricultural Courses," Nanjing Agricultural University - What's New, October 15, 2013, accessed March 8, 2017, <http://english.njau.edu.cn/html/WhatfhsfhNew/2013/10/16/33168ead-f347-4409-9c26-5f2575ac3078.html>.

<sup>103</sup> "Confucius Institute at Moi University," accessed March 10, 2017, <https://cimu.mu.ac.ke>.

Kenyan CIs are expanding outward in addition to the diversification occurring within the institutes. Due to its status as a ‘model’ CI and record of comparatively high performance, the University of Nairobi CI was granted about \$10 million in 2015 to expand its capacity to serve the African continent.<sup>104</sup> In 2016, China agreed to provide the university KES \$2 billion to construct a center exclusively for the CI. The university’s vice-chancellor signed the agreement in Beijing, in the Ministry of Commerce’s office. The proposed CI building is projected to serve 2,000 students with a dormitory, teaching and office facilities, and other public use spaces.<sup>105</sup> Kenyatta University’s CI has expanded by teaching Mandarin to secondary school teachers in Nairobi. This is in preparation for KU and the Kenya Institute of Curriculum Development’s partnership to implement Mandarin instruction at the primary and secondary levels. The CI at University of Nairobi is also involved in the expansion into the nation’s curriculum through the development of teaching materials.<sup>106</sup> Continued expansion such as this demonstrates China’s commitment to image management. Reaching primary and secondary students is an opportunity for China to sell itself to the next generation of political and business leaders, and members of society. It is also a soft power success in the Chinese context in that the Kenyan community has become involved in perpetuating the partnerships, welcoming China’s continued engagement with the country, which illustrates the influential position abroad China is striving towards.

---

<sup>104</sup> Lucie Morangi, “Kenyan Confucius Institute Held up as Model for Africa,” *China Daily*, May 22, 2015, accessed March 8, 2017, [http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2015-05/22/content\\_20789893.htm](http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2015-05/22/content_20789893.htm).

<sup>105</sup> “University of Nairobi Signs a Development Agreement with China worth KES 2 Billion,” University of Nairobi, accessed March 11, 2017, <https://www.uonbi.ac.ke/content/university-nairobi-signs-development-agreement-china-worth-kes-2-billion>.

<sup>106</sup> Benon Herbert Oluka, “Why Kenyan Students are Hooked on Chinese,” Africa-China Reporting Project, October 22, 2013, accessed March 8, 2017, <http://china-africa-reporting.co.za/2013/10/kenya-mandarin-chinese/>. “KICD and KU Partner to Introduce Chinese Curricular in Schools,” News Flash (Kenya Institute of Curriculum Development), April 9, 2014, accessed March 9, 2017, <http://kicd.ac.ke/newsletter/index.php/news/item/405-kicd-and-ku-partner-to-introduce-chinese-curricular-in-schools>.

Lucie Morangi, “Kenyan Confucius Institute Held up as Model for Africa”

CI activities have expanded beyond the classroom as well. As of 2014, twenty trainings for over 700 agricultural professionals have been completed by the EU institute. The CI has partnered with trainees to oversee a twenty-five acre agro-science park.<sup>107</sup> 160 Kenyan technicians have been trained by the China-Africa Joint Research Center, and the China-Africa Joint Laboratory of Crop Molecular Biology was founded at EU. Egerton University has attracted students from Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Rwanda for horticulture training.<sup>108</sup> This is reflective of China's cooperation-focused development aid foreign policy. All four Kenyan CIs convened in Nairobi in order to perform Chinese songs and dances for the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) workers. Members of the education sector (CI students and staff), politics (government officials from both countries), and the construction industry all interacted at the same event.<sup>109</sup> Performances beyond institute walls such as this one have provided China with a stage to showcase the image it wishes the world would see. Additionally, designated cultural weeks, months, and fairs among CIs have given the institutes greater potential to reach local people not affiliated with the institute, and introduce Chinese culture to a wider audience. However, that same advantage carries underlying disadvantages – the CI is limited to a small radius surrounding the event, and people must voluntarily decide to approach and explore the event. If advertisement is lacking, then the event may occur unbeknownst to many nearby, and those with preexisting negative sentiments towards China may avoid the affair altogether, depriving the CI the opportunity to court its most crucial targets. Moreover, much of

---

<sup>107</sup> Esther Mwangi, "China in Partnership with Egerton University," *Kenya News Agency*, September 29, 2014, accessed March 8, 2017, <http://kenyanewsagency.go.ke/en/china-in-partnership-with-egerton-university/>.

<sup>108</sup> "Promoting Science, Education and People-to-People Cooperation, Bridging our Dream Together," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China, November 16, 2016, accessed March 9, 2017, [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjb\\_663304/zwjg\\_665342/zwbdt\\_665378/t1415881.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbdt_665378/t1415881.shtml).  
 "Confucius Institute Offers Agricultural Assistance in Kenya," CGTN Africa, (Video) November 29, 2015, accessed March 9, 2017, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8\\_L9JpHKeVY](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8_L9JpHKeVY).

<sup>109</sup> "The First Event of Performances by Confucius Institutes in Kenya for Mombasa-Nairobi SGR Project Held in Nairobi," The Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Kenya, September 5, 2015, accessed March 9, 2017, <http://ke.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxx/dshd/t1294376.htm>.

the interest in learning Chinese is condensed in urban communities, whereas certain areas in the north and west have not yet received Mandarin language instruction.<sup>110</sup> This should be taken as a restriction on the extent to which CIs have impacted Kenya holistically, i.e. its image management has not reached all areas and the soft power campaign still has room for expansion.

Specific information regarding the number and frequency of Kenyan student visits to China can be difficult to uncover. However, there is evidence of bilateral exchange. In September 2016, twenty students from the KU CI travelled to China to visit Hanban and Shandong Normal University.<sup>111</sup> Eighteen MU students have earned masters or doctoral degrees from Donghua University between 2010 and 2015.<sup>112</sup> In the case of UoN, similar educational transactions have occurred. Kenyan university staff members were chosen to teach Kenyan culture and Swahili language at Tianjin Normal University.<sup>113</sup> Additionally, the CIs boast scholarship opportunities for study abroad programs in China ranging from four weeks to two years.<sup>114</sup> From its inception in 2013 through 2016, seventy-eight UoN students were awarded the ‘Chinese Ambassador’s Scholarship.’<sup>115</sup> The China Scholarship Council (CSC) designates at least five scholarships per year to Chinese students seeking postgraduate training in Kenya.<sup>116</sup> While the exchange has not yet reached equilibrium in the number of students and instructors flowing both directions, the partnership is two-sided, demonstrating an instance of the mutually beneficial cooperation China is seeking.

---

<sup>110</sup> Wanjiku, “Review and the Outlook of the Development of Chinese Language Education in Kenya”

<sup>111</sup> Philip Etyang, “Kenyatta University Launches Chinese Diploma,” *China Daily Africa*, September 23, 2016, accessed March 9, 2017, [http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2016-09/23/content\\_26872648.htm](http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2016-09/23/content_26872648.htm).

<sup>112</sup> “Confucius Institute at Moi University”

<sup>113</sup> Anita C. Wheeler, “China’s Public Diplomacy in Kenya,” 136.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 141.

<sup>115</sup> “Promoting Science, Education and People-to-People Cooperation, Bridging our Dream Together,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China

<sup>116</sup> Kenneth King, “China’s Cooperation in Education and Training with Kenya: A Different Model?,” *International Journal of Education Development* 30, (2010): 491, accessed March 10, 2017, doi:10.1016/j.ijedudev.2010.03.014.

While institute operations offer on the ground examples of Chinese soft power in Kenya, media accounts are important because they highlight the perspectives held by various parties involved. Several motifs can be observed in the majority of Chinese sources reporting on CIs. Prior to discussing the institutes themselves, it is common for Chinese sources to reference Zheng He's voyages which occurred during the Ming Dynasty and appear repeatedly in Chinese chronicles of historic ties between the two countries. One of the voyage's ships is claimed to have wrecked near Pate Island (off the coast of Kenya), after which the Chinese sailors swam to shore and married into the population. The significance of this event is the way in which it appears in discourse regarding Sino-Kenyan relations. Interpretation of Zheng He's voyage is largely dependent on the point of view. Chinese perspectives, including official state news media and government officials, congratulate Zheng He with much grandeur for his accomplishment of establishing ties with East Africa before Europeans. On the other hand, Kenyan sources and officials do not reflect a similar attitude, and some express a degree of skepticism concerning the validity and meaningfulness of the event. There also appears to be significantly fewer Kenyan perspectives on the narrative. This suggests China is more invested in the tale of Zheng He and his role as a symbol of a tradition of friendly ties. Chinese media and government officials are more active and optimistic in promoting age-old China-Kenya accounts than their Kenyan counterparts. The imbalance in number and tone between Kenyan and Chinese outlets of descriptions of Zheng He suggests China is more invested in promoting a certain representation of the relationship. This signifies a deliberate diplomatic effort by China. The language used serves to place China among leading world powers, and to elevate the quality of official ties between China and Kenya. These accounts are relevant to the discussion at hand, in that they are representative of the diplomatic effort the Confucius Institute initiative is operating within. The

gap in Chinese and Kenyan reporting is also significant, in that it reveals a discrepancy between the opinion Kenyans have in reality and the one China desires them to have, signifying a need on China's part to continue soft power efforts through the institutes.

In addition to Zheng He, articles featuring CIs typically begin with a description of a cultural event occurring at the institute. Pictures show Kenyans in traditional Chinese dress, or performing an activity such as singing, dancing, or calligraphy. A few personal anecdotes from one or two students will be shared. Those writing the piece will typically name-drop high-ranking officials and large crowds (if applicable). The event is framed in such a way that it serves to bolster the perceived friendship between the two countries. The quotes from students almost exclusively pertain to: their fascination with Chinese language and culture, China and Africa's economic relationship, the manner in which Chinese language would be beneficial to their careers, and a desire to travel to China to further their studies. While it is reasonable to infer students participating in Confucius Institute activities would have an interest in China, the paradigmatic, hyper-positive, ultra congenial language employed is clearly indicative of China's overarching strategy of image management. In other words, Chinese news sources use CI events as a vehicle for publicizing friendship and cooperation; news articles on CIs are a soft power tool aimed at improving China's image.

Language and content focusing on 'firsts' in Chinese sources is noteworthy as well. The first CI to offer a certain course, compete in a specific competition, or to attain a laudable achievement receives ample praise. For example, references to the University of Nairobi's status as the first CI on the African continent is nearly inescapable. The proclivity to stress 'firsts' may be due to the relatively brief history of Confucius Institutes. 'First'-centered language also cues forward-looking intentions. Referring to an institute as the 'first' of its kind implies further



development and an intention to establish more institutes with similar attributes, signifying the commitment of the government to its state-centered approach to soft power. On the other hand, Kenyan news outlets demonstrate a certain degree of indifference towards CIs, in that there is not a large volume of articles covering them. When CIs are mentioned, it is typically in passing. Convincing Kenyan reporters of positive attributes of the CIs and China in general would serve the image management component of the Chinese soft power endeavor.

Soft power efforts discussed in this section have been unfolding within a largely favorable environment. Aside from occasional anecdotal instances of Kenyans viewing Chinese negatively because of allegations of illegal trading, smuggling ivory, and perceived xenophobia, the typical Kenyan perception of China tends to be positive. According to a 2014 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, 16% of Kenyans viewed China unfavorably, while 74% had a favorable view of China. In 2015, these attitudes shifted to 22% unfavorable, and 70% favorable.<sup>117</sup> A study conducted by the Chinafrica Project between July and August of 2016 found 77% of respondents believe Kenya's relationship with China is beneficial, while 8% disagree. 85% agreed that their relationship is beneficial to Kenya's economy.<sup>118</sup>

While there has not been a clear indication of an increase or decrease in positive opinions in correlation with CI activities, the above polling results suggest China is doing relatively well

---

<sup>117</sup> "Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, But Limited Harm to America's Image," Chapter 2: China's Image, Pew Research Center, July 24, 2014, accessed February 25, 2017, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-2-chinas-image/>.

"Views of China and the Global Balance of Power - Global Ratings for China," Pew Research Center, June 23, 2015, accessed February 25, 2017, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/23/2-views-of-china-and-the-global-balance-of-power/>.

<sup>118</sup> Eric Olander, "What do Kenyans Actually Think of the Chinese in Kenya?" Chinafrica Project, October 1, 2016, accessed February 26, 2017, <http://www.chinaafricaproject.com/kenya-think-chinese-immigration-assimilation-china-housee/>.

A certain degree of caution is warranted when contemplating these results, because Chinese people distributed the survey and collected the data which could have skewed results, as participants may be reluctant to divulge unfavorable views of China to a Chinese person. The survey authors also acknowledge their inability to reach a representative sample – 77% of the respondents were below age 36, and 5% were above age 46. In addition, nearly 70% of the pool has obtained a college degree.

in Kenya with regard to its image. Several thousand students have been trained at Kenya's CIs, and overall, this should be interpreted as a soft power success. China exposed more people abroad to its language and culture, and provided information and resources that were not previously available, leading to an overall greater understanding of China. Presumably, the soft power successes mentioned in this section will eventually benefit China's overall image, influence, and ability to continue economic pursuits in Kenya. However, slightly different conclusions can be drawn when viewing the situation through the lens of a strict interpretation of the traditional Western understanding of soft power, which is the subject of the following section.

### **Confucius Institutes in Kenya According to the Western Conception of Soft Power**

Since the Western and Chinese approaches to soft power differ, it follows that the case study may offer different insights when analyzed according to each definition, and subsequently, distinct implications for China in Africa. Differing definitions does not imply CIs should be excluded from contributing to the soft power discourse per se, as China has demonstrated its own unique conception and application of soft power that includes CIs. The following analysis serves only to suggest potential routes for strengthening China's approach.

To reiterate, the original definition of the Western notion of soft power excludes economic and military elements of a nation's power. The most crucial evidence when analyzing the CIs in Kenya through the lens of the Western conception of soft power is that students commonly cite economic considerations as their motivation for seeking language instruction at the institute. They have observed an increase in the presence of Chinese companies in Kenya, and anticipate employment opportunities. From this perspective, Chinese language becomes a commodity on the job market. In this way, it becomes difficult to parse their affinity for Chinese

culture from a perceived self-advancement rooted in China's economic (hard) power. It is thereby unclear whether Chinese language has won the 'hearts and minds' of the students or if it has grabbed the attention of their resumes and bank accounts, which could potentially hinder China's soft power. Despite the students' aspirations, they discover Chinese companies typically bring their own translators from China for the duration of the projects and job prospects for being a local interpreter are slim. The students realize their newly acquired skill is not as advantageous as they hoped. Furthermore, the CI has been the principal hub for Sino-Kenyan sociocultural communication and exchange in Kenya. If they are to pursue Mandarin as a serious marketable asset, they typically must travel to China to attain fluency.<sup>119</sup> This limitation not only restricts the students' avenues for language practice, but also frustrates the students and hinders the extent to which the institute can achieve: greater understanding of Chinese culture, an improvement of cultural exchange and cooperation, and the promotion of multiculturalism, three of the main objectives of the overall CI initiative.

Interestingly, the opposite phenomenon has occurred with Nigerian CI students. Companies are more willing to reach out to the CI population in Nigeria than in Kenya. While the opportunities are not necessarily abundant, they have been able to grow successful careers as interpreters, demonstrating an actionable career path to current students. As a result, the students maintained relatively positive dispositions. However, since the Nigerian students were not denied access to job opportunities as definitively as the Kenyan students, it is not as easy to untangle Nigerian attitudes about the culture itself from economic aspirations. Nevertheless, China could attempt to improve its image in Kenya by way of advocating for Kenyan acquisition of interpreter positions within Chinese companies, which would presumably make their attitudes

---

<sup>119</sup> Anita C. Wheeler, "China's Public Diplomacy in Kenya," 149.

more positive. In this way, analyzing the CI from a Western perspective of soft power uncovers a route through which the ‘China opportunity’ framework can progress further.

Relatedly, the state-driven efforts of the Kenyan government to promote Chinese language and culture learning for economic reasons challenges soft power according to the Western definition. This is significant because a stronger prevalence of demand-driven attention to the institutes among Kenyan society would strengthen Chinese soft power. In other words, if China succeeded in winning over Kenyan hearts and minds with dynamic cultural activities, the Kenyans would perceive China and its enterprises more favorably. Consequently, Kenyans would be more willing to expand their business dealings with China. A ripple effect would impact Kenyan government officials who would be willing to increase business contracts with China to garner their Kenyan constituents’ approval in order to maintain power within the Kenyan government.

Also worthy of consideration is the fact that English is the primary language used between the two parties when undertaking a dialogue in Kenya outside of the institute.<sup>120</sup> This implies either: A) a significant portion of the population has not felt the need or desire to learn the other’s language to a reasonable level of fluency, or B) there are other more influential forces involved, such as the treatment of English as the ‘international business language.’ Either way, a richer, more complete partnership would result from elevated efforts to communicate in the other party’s language. The use of English implies on a holistic level that not all Kenyans are attracted to Chinese culture; increased use of Mandarin by Kenyans would display a higher degree of fondness for China. Thus, the soft power initiative has room for improvement in this capacity.

While the overall attitudes towards China are mostly positive, there are particular views within Kenyan society that have yet to be won over. For example, Kenyans connected to the

---

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., 158.

construction industry had a more negative view of China than those involved in other business arenas; this may be attributed to speculation concerning China's alleged use of prison labor, or the belief that Chinese workers are replacing Kenyans.<sup>121</sup> Additional grievances include materials and equipment being sourced from China. Perhaps the state-driven efforts have fallen on deaf ears, and a demand-driven affinity for Chinese culture, organically developed among these Kenyan construction workers, is the answer to improving China's image amongst this population.

As this section has highlighted various differences that may arise among interpretations of CIs in Kenya when using a Western notion of soft power, the following section will expound on the implications for both Chinese and Western interpretations of soft power.

---

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 154.

## Chapter Four: Conclusion

### The Significance for Soft Power in the Chinese Context and Implications for China in Africa

Several implications can be drawn from the preceding discussion. The most obvious significance is different understandings of soft power will yield alternate conclusions for the reality of CIs in Kenya. As a result, it can be inferred *one's perspective will inform one's understanding of CI involvement in Kenya*. Nevertheless, *soft power remains a useful framework for analysis despite the different conclusions drawn from the Chinese and Western approaches*. In fact, comparing the two conceptualizations brought an added dimension to the discussion. While the two approaches lead to varied takeaways, it is precisely this contrast that makes soft power a useful theoretical tool for gaining a deeper understanding of the situation. A soft power dialogue was useful in that it: aided in explaining the CIs' role within China's broader foreign policy objectives; brought forth strengths and weaknesses in this regard; and illuminated various ways in which China could further strengthen its image and influence in Kenya.

The observed difference in perception of Chinese soft power and China in Kenya from distinctive points of view has broader implications for the scholarship on China's involvement in Africa as well. A significant proportion of Kenyans through engagement with the institutes have come to understand the 'China opportunity' framework that China desires to achieve for its international presence, and thereby contribute a case of mutually beneficial cooperation and generally positive involvement to the literature on China in Africa. This is also related to the belief among Chinese scholars presented in chapter two – when the 'China opportunity' framework has greater support than that of the 'China threat' theory, China will be able to satisfactorily wield soft power in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. The implication from

the Kenyan case is then: in developing the ‘China opportunity’ notion through successful Confucius Institute activities, China has made impressive strides towards the ability to use soft power to its advantage. However, should China wish to gain the trust of those wary of it in the West, and to further address the ‘China Threat’ theory, it may be advantageous or even necessary for China to address the concerns that became evident through a discussion of the Western soft power approach, namely, the inability to separate individuals’ desire for economic gain through Chinese employment from a genuine affection for the culture, and the need for the admiration to come from Kenyan society, more so than government officials. Essentially, should China wish to improve its image in the West by way of its involvement on the African continent, then it would behoove it to further distinguish hearts and minds from dollar signs.

Another significance for China’s involvement in Africa is that Confucius Institutes are demonstrative of China’s approach to development aid, notably through cooperative bilateral student exchange and the transfer of agricultural and textile engineering technologies. As a result, it can be concluded that China’s soft power initiative and development aid strategies are intimately related. More broadly, these partnerships assist in explaining how Africa plays a meaningful role in China’s rise (rejuvenation). China is mimicking with Africa strategies that it experienced with Japan and the U.S. that enabled all parties to experience economic growth. In other words, Africa is crucial to China’s rise because it offers a platform for cooperation, influence, and continued financial gain in the form of mutual development, during a time when its growth has been slowing steadily. In this instance the significance for Africa would echo that of positive aspects of China’s involvement in the continent, namely, that China has provided African countries with education, infrastructure, and technology helpful in its development goals, and also autonomy and capacity building.

## **Conclusion**


The use of theory provides a set of standard conceptualizations and a streamlined approach to the dilemma. Employing a theoretical framework has been paramount in discerning the institutes' relationship to their context. China's soft power goals are intimately related to its overall foreign policy objectives of achieving a well-received image and acceptance internationally, agenda-setting capabilities, and the ability to seek continued economic growth. Confucius Institutes are a component of China's soft power strategy, and their performance in Kenya reflects that relationship.

This is evident through structural pathways established by the institutes – such as the courses themselves, along with language learning materials that the institutions may not have otherwise had. Additionally, scholarships created an avenue for Kenyan students to study in China. Specialized training offered through CI courses signifies the role of development assistance in Chinese soft power, the possibility for Africa to achieve positive outcomes through engagement with China. In addition to increased variety in coursework, Kenyan CIs have also reached local communities, which is reflective of China's desire for a large base of people to view it favorably. Despite great achievements made through Confucius Institutes towards China's foreign policy objectives, analyzing the CIs with reference to a Western understanding of soft power highlights potential avenues through which China could strengthen its relationship with Kenya and consequently further improve its image and ability to pursue its economic goals. Although Confucius Institutes have only existed for a little over a decade, which is a relatively short time period on the long-term scale that soft power and public diplomacy operate within, it is definitely possible that with time, the institutes could improve as a soft power resource.



The thesis has various implications for Chinese soft power, Sino-African relations, and soft power as a term. Although China and many Western scholars use contrasting definitions for discussing China's initiatives, the term soft power is still beneficial to enhancing one's understanding of the situation. The case study also revealed that Confucius Institutes in Kenya are an instance of mutually beneficial cooperation between China and Africa. Since Kenyans have come to view China as an opportunity, it could be argued that China has progressed closer towards the capacity to wield soft power as it desires. The evidence in the case study and discussion of the implications suggests Africa is instrumental in China's rise, as it is a platform for cooperation, economic growth, and influence. Similarly, China's engagement with Kenya through the institutes has had positive outcomes for Africa as well.

## Appendix



Source:

<http://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/2.1.1+Kenya+Port+of+Mombasa;jsessionid=C33D8FA84648303C871C96737689BDC5>



Source: <http://africabusiness.com/2017/02/11/integration-efforts-in-the-eac/>

## Bibliography

“About Us - Confucius Institute Headquarters.” english.Hanban.org. accessed February 1, 2017.

[http://english.hanban.org/node\\_7716.htm](http://english.hanban.org/node_7716.htm).

Buckley, Chris. “Leader Taps into Chinese Classics in Seeking to Cement Power.” *New York Times*, October 11, 2014, accessed November 3, 2016

Brautigam, Deborah. *The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Breslin, Shaun. “The Soft Notion of China’s ‘Soft Power.’” Chatham House. (February 2011): 6-7. Accessed November 3, 2016

Brown, David. *Hidden Dragon, Crouching Lion: How China’s Advance in Africa is Underestimated and Africa’s Potential Underappreciated*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012.

“China’s Incursion in Kenya’s Higher Education: Partner or Patron?,” *Capital Campus*, April 17, 2013, accessed March 9, 2017, <http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/campus/chinas-incursion-in-kenyas-higher-education-partner-or-patron/>,

Churchman, Michael. “Confucius Institutes and Controlling Chinese Languages.” *China Heritage Quarterly* no. 26 (June 2011). Accessed January 4, 2017

“Confucius Institute at Moi University,” accessed March 10, 2017, <https://cimu.mu.ac.ke>.

“Confucius Institute Offers Agricultural Assistance in Kenya,” CGTN Africa, (Video) November 29, 2015, accessed March 9, 2017, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8\\_L9JpHKeVY](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8_L9JpHKeVY).

“Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes,” [http://english.hanban.org/node\\_7880.htm](http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm), accessed January 6, 2017

d'Hooghe, Ingrid. "The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations." *Public Diplomacy in the People's Republic of China*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Ding, Sheng. "Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: A New Look at China's Rise to the Status Quo Power." *Journal of Contemporary China* 19 no. 64, (March 2010): 255-276.

Ding, Sheng. "Branding a Rising China: An Analysis of Beijing's National Image Management in the Age of China's Rise." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 46, no. 3 (2011): 293-306.

Ding, Sheng and Robert A. Saunders. "Talking Up China: An Analysis of China's Rising Cultural Power and Global Promotion of the Chinese Language." *East Asia* (Summer 2006), accessed January 5, 2017

Ding, Sheng. *The Dragon's Hidden Wings: How China Rises With its Soft Power*. Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2008.

"Diploma in Chinese Language and Culture," Confucius Institute at Kenyatta University, accessed March 11, 2017, <http://www.ku.ac.ke/confucius/images/stories/docs/Diploma-in-Chinese-Language-and-Culture.pdf>.

Economy, Elizabeth. "China Power: Unpacking the Complexity of China's Rise." *Is China's Soft Power Strategy Working?* Center for Strategic and International Studies. Video. Accessed October 12, 2016

"Eight Measures to Boost Overseas Chinese Teaching: Official." China Education and Research Network, June 17 2005, accessed October 24, 2016

“Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Kenya – About the Embassy – Ambassador Liu Xianfa.” accessed February 27, 2017, <http://ke.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxx/lxfds/>.

Etyang, Philip. “Kenyatta University Launches Chinese Diploma,” *China Daily Africa*, September 23, 2016, accessed March 9, 2017, [http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2016-09/23/content\\_26872648.htm](http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2016-09/23/content_26872648.htm).

“First Confucius Institute for Africa Launched in Nairobi.” *Xinhua News Agency*, December 20, 2005, accessed January 4, 2017, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/culture/152442.htm.set>

Gill, Bates, and Yanzhong Huang. “Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power.’” *Survival* 48 no. 2 (Summer 2006), Accessed November 10, 2016

Glaser, Bonnie S. and Melissa E. Murphy. “Soft Power With Chinese Characteristics: The Ongoing Debate.” Center for Strategic International Studies, (March 10 2009). Accessed November 17, 2016

“Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, But Limited Harm to America’s Image,” Chapter 2: China’s Image, Pew Research Center, July 24, 2014, accessed February 25, 2017, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-2-chinas-image/>.

Guangyuan, Liu, H.E.. “From Giraffe the Diplomat to ‘Peace Ark.’” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Kenya, October 11, 2010, accessed February 27, 2017, <http://ke.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t760005.htm>.

Guo, Xiaolin. “Repackaging Confucius: PRC Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Soft Power.” Institute for Security and Development Policy (January 2008): 9.

Hartig, Falk. “Communicating China to the World: Confucius Institutes and China’s Strategic Narratives.” *Politics* 35, No 3-4. (2015), accessed January 3, 2017

Haritg, Falk. "Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China." *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 62, (2012), accessed January 3, 2017

Hartig, Falk. "New Public Diplomacy Meets Old Public Diplomacy - the Case of China and Its Confucius Institutes." *New Global Studies* 8, no. 3 (2014), 348. Accessed January 3, 2017

Heydarian, Richard Javad. "Is China's Soft Power Bubble About to Burst?" *National Interest*, (August 25 2015). Accessed October 13, 2016

Huang, Yanzhong and Sheng Ding. "Dragon's Underbelly: An Analysis of China's Soft Power." *East Asia* (Winter 2006). Accessed November 10, 2016

Kamau, Wango and Li Qiang, "Directors' Message." Kenyatta University Confucius Institute, accessed March 11, 2017, <http://www.ku.ac.ke/confucius/index.php/directors-message.html>.

"Kenya's Uhuru Kenyatta Urges Africa to Give Up Aid." *BBC*, June 12, 2015, accessed March 11, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33108716>.

"Kenyatta University Confucius Institute," accessed March 11, 2017, [http://www.ku.ac.ke/confucius/images/stories/docs/The\\_Confucius\\_Institute\\_Brochure.pdf](http://www.ku.ac.ke/confucius/images/stories/docs/The_Confucius_Institute_Brochure.pdf).

Kibe, Josephine and Mwangi S. Kimenyi, "Africa's Powerhouse," Brookings Institution, January 6, 2014, accessed March 11, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/africas-powerhouse/>.

"KICD and KU Partner to Introduce Chinese Curricular in Schools." News Flash (Kenya Institute of Curriculum Development), April 9, 2014, accessed March 9, 2017,

<http://kicd.ac.ke/newsletter/index.php/news/item/405-kicd-and-ku-partner-to-introduce-chinese-curricular-in-schools>.

King, Kenneth. "China's Cooperation in Education and Training with Kenya: A Different Model?," *International Journal of Education Development* 30, (2010): 488-496., accessed March 10, 2017, doi:10.1016/j.ijedudev.2010.03.014.

Kurlantzick, Joshua. "China's Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 47 (June 2006), accessed November 10, 2016.

Mbugua, Wanjiku J., and Peng Yu, "Review and the Outlook of the Development of Chinese Language Education in Kenya." *Quarterly Journal of Chinese Studies* 3, no. 1 (October 2012): 66-76, accessed March 10, 2017

Morangi, Lucie. "Kenyan Confucius Institute Held up as Model for Africa." *China Daily*, May 22, 2015, accessed March 8, 2017, [http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2015-05/22/content\\_20789893.htm](http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/weekly/2015-05/22/content_20789893.htm).

Mulinge, Esther. "An Analysis of China-Kenya Bilateral Relations on Infrastructure Development," Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, 2012, accessed February 26, 2017, [http://kippra.or.ke/index.php?option=com\\_docman&task=doc\\_view&gid=275&Itemid](http://kippra.or.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=275&Itemid).

Mwangi, Esther, "China in Partnership with Egerton University," *Kenya News Agency*, September 29, 2014, accessed March 8, 2017, <http://kenyanewsagency.go.ke/en/china-in-partnership-with-egerton-university/>.

"NAU Confucius Institute at Egerton University Opens Agricultural Courses," Nanjing Agricultural University - What's New, October 15, 2013, accessed March 8, 2017,

<http://english.njau.edu.cn/html/WhatfhsfhNew/2013/10/16/33168ead-f347-4409-9c26-5f2575ac3078.html>.

Nye Jr., Joseph S. "China Power: Unpacking the Complexity of China's Rise." *Is China's Soft Power Strategy Working?* Center for Strategic and International Studies. Video. accessed October 12, 2016

Nye, Joseph S. Jr. "China's Soft Power Deficit." *Wall Street Journal*, May 8, 2012. accessed October 24, 2016

Nye, Jr., Joseph S. "Get Smart." *Foreign Affairs* 88. no. 4 (July/August 2009). accessed October 18, 2016.

Nye, Jr., Joseph S. "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power." *American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (March 2008). accessed October 18, 2016

Nye, Joseph S. Jr. "Rise of China's Soft Power." Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, December 29 2005. accessed October 24, 2016

Nye, Jr., Joseph S. "Security and Smart Power." *American Behavioral Scientist* 51 no. 9 (May 2008). accessed October 18, 2016.

Nye Jr., Joseph S. "Soft Power." *Foreign Policy* no. 80 (Autumn 1990). accessed November 18, 2016

Nye, Jr., Joseph S. 2004. *Soft Power: The Means to success in World Politics*. New York: PublicAffairs

Nye Jr., Joseph S. 2006. "Think Again: Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*.

Nye Jr., Joseph S. 2011. "The War on Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*.



- “Oil Discovered in Kenya for the First Time.” *Washington Times*, March 26, 2012, accessed March 11, 2017, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/26/oil-discovered-in-kenya-for-first-time/>.
- Olander, Eric. “What do Kenyans Actually Think of the Chinese in Kenya?” Chinafrica Project, October 1, 2016, accessed February 26, 2017, <http://www.chinaafricaproject.com/kenya-think-chinese-immigration-assimilation-china-houseee/>,
- Oluka, Benon Herbert. “Why Kenyan Students are Hooked on Chinese.” Africa-China Reporting Project, October 22, 2013, accessed March 8, 2017, <http://china-africa-reporting.co.za/2013/10/kenya-mandarin-chinese/>.
- Omondi, Daniel Juma. “Kenya’s Foreign Policy Shift from Political to Economic Diplomacy.” University of Nairobi - Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, September 2011, accessed April 26, 2017
- Omondi, Dominic. “Why SGR is a Tiny Part in China’s Game Plan to Become Superpower.” *Standard Digital*, January 22, 2017, accessed April 20, 2017, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000230796/why-sgr-is-a-tiny-part-in-china-s-game-plan-to-become-superpower>
- “Promoting Science, Education and People-to-People Cooperation, Bridging our Dream Together,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China, November 16, 2016, accessed March 9, 2017, [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjb\\_663304/zwjg\\_665342/zwbdt1415881.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbdt1415881.shtml).

- “Report: Development Aid at a Glance.” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2016, accessed March 11, 2017, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/2%20Africa%20-%20Development%20Aid%20at%20a%20Glance%202016.pdf>.
- Sayama, Osamu. “China’s Approach to Soft Power: Seeking a Balance between Nationalism, Legitimacy, and International Influence.” Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, (March 2016). Accessed October 23, 2016
- Schumacher, Frank. 2015. “Hard Lessons of ‘Soft Power.’” The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Accessed November 18, 2016
- Shambaugh, David. “China Power: Unpacking the Complexity of China’s Rise.” *Is China’s Soft Power Strategy Working?* Center for Strategic and International Studies. Video. Accessed October 12, 2016
- Shambaugh, David. 2015. “China’s Soft Power Push: The Search for Respect.” *Foreign Affairs* 94, no. 4 (July/August). Accessed October 11, 2016
- Singh, Apurva and Dylan Johnson. “Deal or No Deal: Strictly Business for China in Kenya?” Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank Group, (March 2016): 4-6; 25, accessed February 21, 2017, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/801581468195561492/pdf/WPS7614.pdf>.
- “Sun Tzu and the Art of Soft Power.” *The Economist*, (December 17 2011). Accessed October 24, 2016
- “The First Event of Performances by Confucius Institutes in Kenya for Mombasa-Nairobi SGR Project Held in Nairobi,” The Embassy of the People’s Republic in China in the Republic

of Kenya, September 5, 2015, accessed March 9, 2017, <http://ke.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxx/dshd/t1294376.htm>.

“University of Nairobi Signs a Development Agreement with China worth KES 2 Billion,”

University of Nairobi, accessed March 11, 2017,

<https://www.uonbi.ac.ke/content/university-nairobi-signs-development-agreement-china-worth-kes-2-billion>.

“Views of China and the Global Balance of Power - Global Ratings for China,” Pew Research

Center, June 23, 2015, accessed February 25, 2017,

<http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/23/2-views-of-china-and-the-global-balance-of-power/>.

Wang, Yiwei. “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. 16, (March 2008), accessed November 3, 2016.

Wheeler, Anita C. “China’s Public Diplomacy in Kenya: the Case of Chinese Language and Cultural Programs at the University of Nairobi Confucius Institute.” Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest, 2012.

Yuan, Zhenjie, et al. “Confucius Institutes and the Limitations of China’s Global Cultural Network.” *China Information* 30, no. 3 (2016): accessed January 4, 2017

Zaharna, R.S., et al. *Confucius Institutes and the Globalization of China’s Soft Power*. Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa Press, 2014.

**Biography**

Teresa is a 2017 graduate of The University of Texas at Austin: Plan II Honors and International Relations and Global Studies, International Security track. Pursuant to her regional interest in Asia, she has also studied Mandarin Chinese. This year she completed an honors capstone for the IRG major and Plan II entitled “Confucius Institutes in Context: An Investigation of Chinese Soft Power.” This past summer, Teresa studied Chinese language, politics, and governance in Shanghai, China, while completing a research internship with Albright Stonebridge Group LLC, a firm specializing in commercial diplomacy and strategic advisory. Her academic interests include international law and security, global affairs, and the impact of domestic statecraft on international relations. Teresa is also captivated by the current discourse within IR regarding the role of development in spurring insecurity. Following graduation, Teresa intends to acquire an engaging position in the international relations field, and to study and pursue a career in international law.